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YOU DON'T OWN ME: RECOMMENDATIONS TO PROTECT
HUMAN CONTRIBUTORS OF BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL AFTER
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY V. CA TALONA
LAURA

B. RowE*

INTRODUCTION

The last time you had blood drawn or a biopsy taken, did you think

about what would happen to that sample after the laboratory tests had been
conducted? The thought likely never crossed your mind-and if it did, you
probably guessed that it would somehow be destroyed or disposed of. It

probably comes as a surprise, then, that your blood, tissue, or other biological material' is likely stored in at least one biobank or biorepository. 2 In
fact, the hospital or laboratory that tested your specimen may have even
sold it to a biotechnology 3 company, profiting from your blood, or your
4
tissue.

* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, May 2009. B.A., Psychology, University of WisconsinMadison, 2006. I would like to thank Professor Lori Andrews and Gina Bicknell for their invaluable
guidance. I would also like to thank my parents, Judy and Ed, and my sister, Susan, for their love and
support, as well as Michael Greenspan for his endless encouragement.
1. In this note, the term "biological material" or "human biological material" will include human
tissues (e.g., blood, bone, muscle, and skin), cells, DNA, gametes (i.e., sperm and ova), and waste (e.g.,
hair, urine, and feces). See NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, I RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 1-2 (1999), available at
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/past-commissions/nbac-biological I .pdf [hereinafter NBAC REPORT];
see also OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS-SPECIAL REPORT 24 (1987),
available at

http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/8719.pdf [hereinafter OTA SPECIAL REPORT].
2. See Lori Andrews, The Battle Over the Body, TRIAL, Oct. 2006, at 22, 26. In this note, the
terms "biobank" and "biorepository" will be used interchangeably to refer to "[a]n organization, place,
room, or container (a physical entity) where biospecimens are stored." NAT'L CANCER INST., U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE BEST PRACTICES FOR
BIOSPECIMEN RESOURCES
30 (2007), available at http://biospecimens.cancer.gov/globaU
pdfs/NClBestPractices_060507.pdf [hereinafter NCI BEST PRACTICES]; see also Michael J. Malinowski, Taking Genomics to the BioBank: Access to Human Biological Samples and Medical Information, 66 LA. L. REv. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 43, 43 (2005) ("Biobanking is the organized collection of DNA
and accompanying medical information from human populations.").
3. Broadly defined, the term "biotechnology" "includes any technique that uses living organisms
(or parts of organisms) to make or modify products, to improve plants or animals, or to develop microorganisms for specific uses-including recently developed techniques such as gene cloning and cell
fusion." OTA SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
4. Andrews, supra note 2, at 26.
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Researchers have been storing human biological materials for well
over one hundred years. 5 As the turn of the twenty-first century approached, researchers hoping to discover the genetic causes of various diseases recognized the increasing need for biological data from large
populations; as a result, the practice of storing human biological materials
in biobanks and biorepositories became significantly more widespread. 6
The effect of biobanking has been astounding: in 1999, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) 7 estimated that biobanks across the
United States house at least 282 million specimens-from over 176 million
individuals-and over twenty million new samples are added each year. 8
While many individuals knowingly contribute 9 their specimens to these
biobanks for research purposes, a significant portion of these specimens is
procured from individuals who, at the time of extraction, are unaware that
researchers intend to use their tissue or fluids for research purposes.10 In
many instances, health care providers obtain a patient's biological material
during the course of medical treatment; 11 once the health care provider has
conducted the appropriate tests necessary for the patient's treatment, he or
she may reap economic benefits from the patient's biological material by
5. NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 1; Sheri Alpert, Privacy and the Analysis of Stored Tissues,
in 2 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS:
ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE A-1, A- 12 (1999).
6. Henry T. Greely, The Uneasy Ethical and Legal Underpinnings of Large-Scale Genomic
Biobanks, 8 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 343, 346 (2007).
7. NBAC was established pursuant to Executive Order in 1995; after NBAC expired in 2001, the
President's Council on Bioethics was established. The President's Council on Bioethics: Former Bioethics Commissions, http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/past-commissions/index.html
(last visited
January 8, 2009); The President's Council on Bioethics: Executive Order 13237 (Nov. 28, 2001),
http://www.bioethics.gov/about/executive.html.
8. NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. A report published by the RAND Corporation in 1999
made a "conservative estimate" that over 307 million tissue samples-from over 178 million peoplewere stored in the United States. Rebecca Skloot, Taking the Least of You, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 16,
2006, § 6, at 38, 40, availableat http://home.earthlink.net/--rskloot/TakingTheLeast.pdf.
9. In this note, the terms "contribute" and "contributor" will be used instead of "donate" and
"donor," as the latter terms "may imply a waiver of the contributor's rights in the tissue specimen."
Barbara J. Evans & Eric M. Meslin, Encouraging TranslationalResearch Through Harmonization of
FDA and Common Rule Informed Consent Requirements for Research with Banked Specimens, 27 J.
LEGAL MED. 119, 124 n.19 (2006) (discussing the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) concern
over the implied meaning of the term "donation"); see also Ellen Wright Clayton, Karen K. Steinberg,
Muin J. Khoury, Elizabeth Thomson, Lori Andrews, Mary Jo Ellis Kahn, Loretta Kopelman & Joan 0.
Weiss, Informed Consent for Genetic Research on Stored Tissue Samples, 274 JAMA 1786, 1787
(1995) (arguing that it is inappropriate "to refer to people from whom samples are obtained as 'donors'
because this term "implies an intent to make a gift or to relinquish control that may not apply to any
particular individual").
10. Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 189-90 (2000); see
also NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 7 ("Once stored, human biological materials have been available
for research, usually without the knowledge or consent of the sources .... ").
1I. NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 2; see Elizabeth E. Appel Blue, Redefining Stewardship Over
Body Parts,21 J.L. & HEALTH 75, 79 (2007).
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selling the specimen to a biotechnology research firm. 12
As Professor Donna Gitter explains, this system has resulted in an
"unprecedented commercialization of the human body, and both research13
ers and shareholders in biotech firms routinely profit from this process.'
By some estimates, the human tissue industry generates approximately one
billion dollars each year. 14 Yet, as Professor Radhika Rao notes, the current
state of the law on biomedical research "permits commodification and
commercialization of the body by everyone except the person who provides
the 'raw materials."' 15 For instance, California law prohibits the compensation of women who supply their eggs for embryonic stem cell research, yet
it permits the granting of patents upon the human tissue lines created
through such research. 16
Without a doubt, research using stored biological materials has led to
significant treatments and cures for some of the most devastating ailments
and diseases. 17 But, as science and medicine have rapidly advanced, and as
12. Professor Andrews provided an interesting narrative on this issue:
In October 2001, 1 spoke to the national meeting of the College of American Pathologists and
learned that health care institutions were routinely selling their patients' tissue to biotechnology companies, often without consent of the patients involved. Some pathologists in the audience said that adequate diagnosis was being impeded by these sales. Pathologists would
attempt to undertake an autopsy, but find that the bones and other tissue had already been removed for sale, preventing them from correctly assessing the medical condition of the individual.
Lori B. Andrews, Harnessing the Benefits of Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 22, 23 (2005); see also
Mahoney, supra note 10, at 189-90.
13. Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A ProposalforFederalRecognition of Human
Research Participants' Property Rights in Their Biological Material, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257,
300 (2004).
14. E.g., Blue, supra note 11, at 77 (noting that the tissue industry "has evolved from approximately a $20 million dollar industry in the early 1990s to a billion dollar industry in 2003"); Michelle
Oberman, When the Truth Is Not Enough: Tissue Donation, Altruism, and the Market, 55 DEPAUL L.
REV. 903, 911 (2006).
15. Radhika Rao, Genes and Spleens: Property,Contract, or Privacy Rights in the Human Body?,
35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 371, 371 (2007). What this means is that a researcher or institution may sell a
contributor's sample to a biobank or biotechnology firm for a profit, without compensating the human
source of the sample. See id. However, if contributors specifically seek out compensation at the time of
contribution, they are free to "play the tissue market as well as any biotech company." Skloot, supra
note 8, at 44. As a result, some patient groups have begun to create their own tissue banks, allowing
them to control the use and commercialization of their tissues. See Anne Nichols Hill, Note, One Man's
Trash is Another Man's Treasure, Bioprospecting: Protectingthe Rights and Interests of Human Donors of Genetic Material,5 HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 259, 278 (2002).
16. Rao, supra note 15, at 380 n.2. The risks, benefits, ethics, and legality of patenting human
genes are all beyond the scope of this note. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Lori B.
Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives with Health Needs, 2
HOUSTON J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 65, 89 (2002).
17. See Alpert, supra note 5, at A-4 ("Many of the most important advances made in medical
science would have been more difficult were it not for the analysis of collected and stored human
tissues."). For instance, after a series of studies on precancerous lesions of the uterine cervix in the
1960s, the Pap smear became a commonly used method of early diagnosis of cervical cancer. Allen
Buchanan, An Ethical Frameworkfor Biological Samples Policy, in 2 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY
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the market value of the human body and its parts continues to increase, 18
many legal and ethical dilemmas have developed. 19 In the area of human
subjects research, legal battles over these difficult issues have waged for
nearly two decades, beginning with the landmark case of Moore v. Regents
of the University of California.2o The Moore case arose after doctors and
researchers at the University of California convinced leukemia patient John
Moore to attend postsurgery follow-up visits, during which they withdrew
21
blood, skin, bone marrow, sperm, and other types of cells from Moore.
Moore's physician told him that these visits were "'necessary and required
for his health and well-being,"' but in reality, they were looking to use
Moore's T-lymphocytes 22 to develop a cell line. 23 After successfully doing
so, the researchers and the University applied for, and obtained, a patent on
Moore's T-lymphocyte cell line. 24 The Supreme Court of California held
that Moore had successfully stated causes of action against his physician
for lack of informed consent and breach of fiduciary duty. 25 However, the
majority held that Moore could not sustain his claim for conversion, be26
cause he had neither ownership nor possessory rights in his excised cells.
COMM'N, RESEARCH

INVOLVING HUMAN

BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY

GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at B-I, B-13. Similarly, research on lung tissue from deceased smokers
played a significant role in establishing that smoking has a causational effect on the development of
lung cancer. Id.
18. See Blue, supra note 11, at 77 ("[T]he raw component for this industry is the human body,
which continues to increase in market value. On average a cadaver generates between $30,000 to
$50,000 in value, but a single cadaver can generate over $200,000.").
19. As Professor Andrews explained, the $28.5 billion biotechnology industry "is not without
controversy." Andrews, supra note 12, at 22. In particular, Professor Andrews illustrated the numerous
issues raised by the biobanking sector of this industry:
What type of information, if any, should the source of the tissue be given before tissue is entered into a biobank? What cultural and personal values might it violate for [a] person's tissue
to be used without his or her informed consent? What should be done with the genetic information gleaned from a biobank? Under what circumstances is commercialization of biobank
samples and information appropriate? How should the fruits of biobanking be distributed?
How can people protect themselves from unauthorized and unwanted use of, or commercialization of, their tissue samples? What new institutional policies and legal regulations might be
necessary to govern the emerging biobank economy?
Id. at 23-24.
20. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
21. Id. at481.
22. A T-lymphocyte is a type of white blood cell that produces lymphokines-or proteins-that
regulate the immune system. See id. at 481 n.2; see also NEIL A. CAMPBELL & JANE B. REECE,
BIOLOGY 904-06 (6th ed. 2002).
23. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
24. Id. at 481-82. See generally Unique T-Lymphocyte Line and Products Derived Therefrom,
U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032 (filed Jan. 6, 1983).
25. Moore, 793 P.2d at 480, 483.
26. Id. at 480, 488-89. According to the Moore court, conversion is "a tort that protects against
interference with possessory and ownership interests in personal property," and was "originally used to
determine whether the loser or the finder of a horse had the better title." Id. at 487-88. Furthermore, the
court stated that, "'[t]o establish a conversion, [a] plaintiff must establish an actual interference with his
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In 2003, individuals who had knowingly contributed tissue and fluids
for research on Canavan disease 27 sued the physician and hospital that used
their biological materials to isolate and patent the gene causing the disease. 28 In Greenbergv. Miami Children'sHospitalResearch Institute, Inc.,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the plaintiffs' claim for conversion, stating that the plaintiffs did not
have any "cognizable property interest in body tissue and genetic matter
donated for research under a theory of conversion" because they had made
"donations to research without any contemporaneous expectations of retum." 2 9

Whereas Moore and Greenberg involved patients and contributors objecting to researchers trying to control the products made from their biological materials (for example, by patenting their cell lines), 30 the most recent
controversy-Washington University v. Catalona3 1l-stems from competing claims over the ownership of biological materials themselves.32 This
dispute began when Dr. William Catalona, a renowned prostate cancer
surgeon and researcher, decided to leave Washington University (WU) for

ownership or right of possession.... Where [the] plaintiff neither has title to the property alleged to
have been converted, nor possession thereof, he cannot maintain an action for conversion."' Id. at 488
(citing Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 593, 610-11 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981)).
27. Canavan disease is a degenerative genetic disease, most typically affecting Ashkenazi Jewish
babies. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, CANAVAN DISEASE 511 (27th ed., Lippincott Williams &
Wilkins 2000).
28. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1066-67
(S.D. Fla. 2003). See generally Aspartoacylase Gene, Protein, and Methods of Screening for Mutations
Associated with Canavan Disease, U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635 (filed Sept. 9, 1994).
29. Id. at 1064, 1074, 1076. The court went on to distinguish various cases cited by the plaintiffs
in support of their argument, stating that these cases "do not involve voluntary donations to medical
research." Id. at 1075 ("See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991) (aggregate
of rights existing in body tissue is similar to property rights); York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425
(E.D. Va. 1989) (couple granted property rights in their frozen embryos)."). It should be noted that,
while the Greenbergcourt dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for conversion and lack of informed consent,
among others, the court did find that the plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a cause of action for unjust
enrichment. 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1072. Under this claim, the plaintiffs argued that they would not have
provided the researchers with a benefit-their genetic material, as well as their time and effort-if they
had known that the researchers intended to commercialize their genetic material through patents and
restrictive licenses. Id. According to the plaintiffs, the researchers' retention of such benefits "violates
the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience." Id. For further discussion of an
unjust enrichment cause of action in this context, see Debra L. Greenfield, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital: Unjust Enrichment and the Patentingof Human Genetic Material, 15 ANNALS HEALTH
L. 213,214-25 (2006).
30. See Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1068; Moore, 793 P.2d at 487; Lori Andrews, Who Owns
Your Body? A Patient's Perspective on Washington University v. Catalona, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
398, 400 (2006).
31. 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff'd, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 1122 (2008), and cert denied sub. nom. Ward v. Wash. Univ., 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008).
32. Id. at 994; see Andrews, supra note 30, at 402.
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a new position at Northwestern University (Northwestern) in 2003. 33 For
approximately twenty-five years, Dr. Catalona had collected samples of
patients' biological materials to use for prostate cancer research, and he
was instrumental in establishing the Genitourinary (GU) Biorepository. 34
In compliance with the federal research regulations, 35 Dr. Catalona and
WU required each research participant to complete an informed consent
form prior to contributing their biological material. 36 In addition to the
consent forms, each research participant received and signed a genetic research information brochure. 37
When Dr. Catalona accepted the position at Northwestern, he sent letters to his patients and other individuals who had contributed biological
materials to the GU Biorepository, informing them of his departure from
WU and his intention to continue researching prostate cancer at Northwestern. 3 8 Dr. Catalona also explained that, to succeed in his research goals, he
needed continued access to their contributed samples; therefore, he requested that the recipient sign and return a "release form," which authorized the transfer of the contributor's samples to Dr. Catalona at
Northwestern. 39 After learning of this, WU filed a lawsuit against Dr. Catalona, seeking declaratory judgment that WU was the rightful owner of the
biological materials in the GU Biorepository, and a permanent injunction to
prevent Dr. Catalona from transferring the samples. 40 Eight of Dr. Catalona's patients later sought to intervene in the case; while the district court
denied that motion, it nevertheless added the patients as defendants, hold33. Catalona,437 F. Supp. 2d at 988.
34. Id. at 988-89. The GU Biorepository houses biological material, including prostate tissue
specimens, blood, and DNA samples, for prostate cancer research. Id. at 988. In addition, the GU
Biorepository is located in one or more buildings owned by WU, and WU has provided the majority of
the funding for its operation and maintenance. Id. at 989. As of April 2005, the GU Biorepository
contained 100,000 serum samples and 4,400 DNA samples, for example; some of these samples came
from Dr. Catalona's patients, some came from other WU physicians' patients, and some came from
individuals who were not patients of Dr. Catalona or any other WU physician. Id. at 988-89. Dr. Catalona, as well as other WU physicians, had conducted prostate cancer research studies using the material
in the GU Biorepository; in some instances, Dr. Catalona was named the study's "Principal Investigator," but the research studies were "collaborative effort[s] involving substantial work by many individuals, all of whom were/are employees of WU." Id. at 989-90.
35. See discussion infra Part I.
36. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 993.
39. Id. The "Medical Consent & Authorization" form read:
I have donated a tissue and/or blood sample for Dr. William J. Catalona's research studies.
Please release all of my samples to Dr. Catalona at Northwestern University upon his request.
I have entrusted these samples to Dr. Catalona to be used only at his direction and with his
express consent for research projects.
Id. Approximately six thousand recipients returned their signed authorization form to Dr. Catalona. Id.
40. See id. at 987-88.
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ing that they were necessary parties to the case. 4 1
After holding a hearing to determine the ownership of the biological
materials-which the district court decided was the dispositive issue in the
case 4 2-the court granted summary judgment to WU, holding that the research participants had given the samples to WU as inter vivos gifts. 43 Accordingly, the court also held that WU owned the biological materials in
the GU Biorepository, and that neither Dr. Catalona nor any research par44
ticipant had any ownership rights or proprietary interest in the samples.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court's conclusions, holding that research participants
"who make an informed decision to contribute their biological materials
voluntarily to a particular research institution for the purpose of medical
research" do not "retain an ownership interest" in their materials. 4 5 Instead,
the Eighth Circuit held that the research participants made valid inter vivos
gifts under Missouri common law. 4 6 The district court expressed grave
concern that a contrary ruling would stifle future scientific research. 47 Ironically, however, the Eighth Circuit's affirmation of that decision, in combination with unclear and insufficient federal research regulations, threatens
to do just that.
Part I of this note reviews the doctrine of informed consent and its role
in the federal regulations governing research conducted on human subjects.
Part II examines the issue of informed consent in Washington University v.
Catalona;this Part then analyzes the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Catalona,
ultimately concluding that the court's decision was, first, erroneous under
Missouri common law and, second, precluded by the applicable federal
regulations. Recognizing the need for reform, Part III proposes amendments to the federal research regulations that will ensure the continued
advancement of biomedical research, while also protecting the human contributors of the biological materials that are necessary for future research.
41. Order dated Mar. 14, 2005 at 2, Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo.
2006) (No. 4:03CV01065).
42. Catalona,437 F. Supp. 2d at 994.
43. Id. at 997.
44. Id. at 1002.
45. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 673, 677 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1122
(2008), and cert. deniedsub nom. Ward v. Wash. Univ., 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008).
46. Id. at 674, 676.
47. See Catalona,437 F. Supp. 2d at 1002. Interestingly, many of the district court's examples of
the tragedies that would result from a contrary decision actually depict the current state of biomedical
research and biobanking. For instance, the court asserted: "If left unregulated and to the whims of a
[contributor], these highly-prized biological materials would become nothing more than chattel going to
the highest bidder." Id. However, researchers already frequently sell samples of human biological
material to biobanks. See supra notes 15 & 18 and accompanying text.
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THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT AND THE COMMON RULE

Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo established the doctrine of informed
48
consent in the 1914 case Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital.
49
Based upon notions of autonomy and bodily integrity, Justice Cardozo
stated that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body."' 50 For decades following the Schloendorff decision, the United States Congress and various administrative agencies enacted a patchwork of laws, regulations, and
guidelines designed to provide increasingly greater protection of human
research subjects' bodily integrity and autonomy. 5 1 In 1974, the federal
agency that was later renamed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 52 promulgated comprehensive regulations known as the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, forming the initial
version of 45 C.F.R. part 46, subpart A. 53 In response to the Belmont Report,54 HHS revised the regulations in 1981.55 After their adoption by sixteen federal departments and agencies in 1991, the regulations in 45 C.F.R.
56
part 46, subpart A became known as the Common Rule.
48. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3
(N.Y. 1957), and superseded by statute on other grounds, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2007). In Schloendorff, a hospital patient consented to a particular examination, but-contrary to
the advice of her doctors-refused to undergo an operation. 105 N.E. at 93. While she was unconscious,
doctors conducted both the examination and the operation. Id. The hospital patient alleged that the
operation was administered without her consent or knowledge, and sought to charge the hospital with
liability for the wrong based on a theory of trespass. Id.
49. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (citing Schloendorff, 105
N.E. at 93).
50. Schloendorff 105 N.E. at 93.
51. See ERIN D. WILLIAMS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL PROTECTION FOR HUMAN
RESEARCH SUBJECTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON RULE AND ITS INTERACTIONS WITH FDA

REGULATIONS AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 12-13 (updated June 2, 2005) available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32909.pdf.
52. In 1980, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare officially became known as the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Id. at 5, 14.
53. Id. at 5, 14, 63 n.150; see generally45 C.F.R. pt. 46, subpt. A (2007).
54. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN
SUBJECTS
OF
RESEARCH
(1979),
available
at

http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.htm. The Belmont Report outlined three
main ethical principles of human subjects research: (I) respect for persons, (2) beneficence, and (3)
justice. Id. § B.
55. WILLIAMS, supra note 51, at 14. This was the first and only time 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 has been
amended. See id. at 12-16.
56. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,003 (June 18, 1991).
Today, the Common Rule governs the human research activities conducted or supported by eighteen
federal departments and agencies. WILLIAMS, supra note 51, at 6. HHS later adopted 45 C.F.R. pt. 46,
subpts. B-D, which protect "women and neonates, prisoners, and children, respectively." Id. Since they
were adopted later, these subparts are not part of the regulations that are referred to as the Common

Rule. Id.
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One of the most significant sections of the Common Rule codifies the
doctrine of informed consent and provides that "no investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research covered by this policy unless
the investigator has obtained the legally effective informed consent of the
subject or the subject's legally authorized representative."' 57 One of the
essential elements of informed consent under the Common Rule is "[a]
statement that participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve
no penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled, and
the subject may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or
loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled."' 58 Finally,
45 C.F.R. § 46.116 states that "[n]o informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any exculpatory language through which the subject or the
representative is made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject's
legal rights . . -59
The Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) 60 is charged with
interpreting and enforcing the Common Rule. 61 Pursuant to this authority,
OHRP is responsible for ensuring that all federally funded institutions, such
as WU, comply with the regulations. 62 Under the Common Rule, all federally funded institutions must provide OHRP with written assurance that it
will comply with the requirements set forth in the regulations. 63 This assurance obligates the entire institution-including institutional officials and

57. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.
58. Id. § 46.116(a)(8). Section 46.116(b)(5) also provides that, "[w]hen appropriate," "[a] statement that significant new findings developed during the course of the research which may relate to the
subject's willingness to continue participation will be provided to the subject." Id. § 46.116(b)(5).
59. Id. § 46.116 (emphasis added). The entire provision reads as follows:
No informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any exculpatory language through
which the subject or representative is made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject's
legal rights, or releases or appears to release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution or its
agents from liability for negligence.
Id.
60. OHRP is an office of HHS. WILLIAMS, supra note 51, at 16. Until 2000, OHRP was known as
the Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR) and was an office of the National Institutes of
Health (NIH). Id. at 13, 15-16.
61. See Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 289 (2006).
62. See id.While a great number of research projects in the United States are federally funded
and, thus, fall under the guise of the Common Rule, private biobanks are not covered by the Common
Rule. Yael Bregman-Eschet, GeneticDatabasesand Biobanks: Who Controls Our Genetic Privacy?,23
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 19 (2006). In fact, though private biobanks often
obtain their samples from public (federally funded) institutions, private biobanks are generally unregulated in the United States. Id. at 1.
63. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(a). Nearly 10,000 research institutions, including universities and hospitals, have formal agreements (called "assurances") with OHRP to comply with the federal research
regulations. OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OHRP

FACT SHEET (2005), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/about/ohrpfactsheet.pdf.
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researchers-to comply with the Common Rule. 64 Under its enforcement
power, OHRP may also impose various sanctions on federally funded insti65
tutions that are not in full compliance with the regulations.
Although the exculpatory language provision of the Common Rule
states that researchers may not ask contributors to waive any of their legal
rights, 66 the Common Rule does not explicitly address whether a research
participant retains an ownership interest in the biological materials he or
she contributes to biomedical research. However, OHRP's "guidance topic" on informed consent provides examples of the exculpatory language
prohibited under 45 C.F.R. § 46.116, such as: "[b]y consent to participate
in this research, I give up any property rights I may have in bodily fluids or
tissue samples obtained in the course of the research. '' 67
Further evidence of the meaning of the Common Rule's exculpatory
language provision can be found in an OHRP letter sent to Louisiana State
University (LSU) in response to allegations of noncompliance:
HHS regulations at 45 CFR 46.116 prohibit any oral or written exculpatory language in the informed consent process, through which the subject
is made to waive, or appear to waive, any legal rights. OHRP finds the
following language in the IRB 68 -approved informed consent document

64. See OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
OHRP's COMPLIANCE OVERSIGHT PROCEDURES FOR EVALUATING INSTITUTIONS 1 (2005), availableat

http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/compliance/ohrpcomp.pdf
65. See id. at 1, 3-7.
66. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.
67. Office for Prot. from Research Risks [now OHRP], "Exculpatory Language" in Informed
Consent (Nov. 15, 1996), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/exculp.htm [hereinafter
Exculpatory Language Guidance Topic]. The full text of the guidance topic reads as follows:
No informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any exculpatory language through
which the subject is made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject's legal rights, or releases or appears to release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution, or its agents from liability for negligence.
Examples of Exculpatory Language: By agreeing to this use, you should understand that
you will give up all claim to personal benefit from commercial or other use of these substances; I voluntarily and freely donate any and all blood, urine, and tissue samples to the
U.S. Government and hereby relinquish all right, title, and interest to said items; By consent
to participate in this research, I give up any property rights I may have in bodily fluids or tissue samples obtained in the course of the research; I waive any possibility of compensation
for injuries that I may receive as a result of participation in this research.
Examples of Acceptable Language: Tissue obtained from you in this research may be used
to establish a cell line that could be patented and licensed. There are no plans to provide financial compensation to you should this occur; By consenting to participate, you authorize
the use of your bodily fluids and tissue samples for the research described above; This hospital is not able to offer financial compensation nor to absorb the costs of medical treatment
should you be injured as a result of participating in this research; This hospital makes no
commitment to provide free medical care or payment for any unfavorable outcomes resulting
from participation in this research. Medical services will be offered at the usual charge.
Id. (citation omitted).
68. An IRB is "any board, committee, or other group formally designated by an institution to
review, to approve the initiation of, and to conduct period review of, biomedical research involving
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signed by the subject in the above research to be exculpatory: "By your
consent to participation in this research study, you give up your property
rights that you may have in your bodily fluids, substances or tissues.- 69
Additionally, in a letter sent to WU in November 2007-after the
Eighth Circuit's decision--OHRP stated:
[E]xcept in jurisdictions in which it has been conclusively determined
that all research subjects have no legal rights in their excised human biological material, OHRP continues to find language that waives any such
legal rights on the part of research subjects to be exculpatory. We believe
that, to date, no jurisdictions have conclusively determined that all human subjects have no legal rights
in their excised biological material that
70
is used for research purposes.
Therefore, based on statements made in its guidance topic and its let-

ters to LSU and WU, OHRP clearly interprets the Common Rule as barring
researchers and institutions from asking potential contributors to waive
their legal right of ownership in their excised biological material. 7 1
human subjects. The primary purpose of such review is to assure the protection of the rights and welfare
of the human subjects." 21 C.F.R. § 56.102(g) (2008) (defining the function of an [RB in the similar
context of research regulated by the FDA). For the portions of the Common Rule covering IRBs, see 45
C.F.R. §§ 46.107-.115.
69. Letter from Carol J. Weil, Div. of Compliance Oversight, Office for Human Research Prots.,
to John C. McDonald, Chancellor/Dean, La. State Univ. Health Sci. Ctr. Shreveport 2 (Oct. 31, 2005),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/detrmjletrs/YR06/jan06a.pdf [hereinafter OHRP Letter to LSU].
Coincidentally, the research project for which LSU used this exculpatory language also involved prostate cancer research. See id at 1. In a similar letter to the University of Michigan, OHRP stated, in
pertinent part:
OHRP finds the following language in the IRB-approved informed consent document for the
above-referenced research to be exculpatory: "Your DNA samples might be used to develop
commercially valuable medical products. By signing this form, you agree not to seek share of
any proceeds that might result; that is, you waive any claim to share in the commercialization
of products developed from your DNA samples."
Letter from Patrick J. McNeilly, Compliance Oversight Coordinator, Div. of Compliance Oversight,
Office for Human Research Prots., to Fawwaz T. Ulaby, Vice President for Research, Univ. of Mich. 2
(June 29, 2004), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/detrm-letrs/YR04/un04c.pdf [hereinafter OHRP
Letter to U of M].
70. Letter from Ivor A. Pritchard, Acting Dir., Office for Human Research Prots., to Samuel L.
Stanley, Jr., Vice Chancellor for Research, Wash. Univ. Sch. of Med. 5a (Nov. 29, 2007) (on file with
The Chicago-Kent Law Review) [hereinafter OHRP Letter to WU]. In this letter, OHRP confirmed that
it conducted a compliance oversight investigation of WU in 2000, and that it did not make a finding of
noncompliance with regard to a WU informed consent document template that contained the following
language: "[N]or can you claim ownership rights to any medical or scientific product that results from
research with your tissue.... You will receive no monetary payment nor can you claim ownership
rights to any medical or scientific product that results from research with your tissue.. " Id. at 4a-5a.
However, OHRP indicated that this finding did not equate to a finding of compliance: "[P]lease note
that OHRP's failure to make a finding of noncompliance regarding this informed consent language is
not an indication that OHRP found this language to be in compliance with the HHS protection of human
subjects regulations." Id. at 5a. In addition, OHRP stated in this letter that, when it conducts compliance
oversight investigations, it will find that an institution's consent form contains prohibited exculpatory
language if the consent form includes any of the example language in OHRP's guidance document. Id.
at 4a. Therefore, OHRP asked WU to "ensure that any such language is removed from consent documents currently used at [WU] for human subjects research ... " Id. at 5a.
71. See Reply in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4-5, Ward v. Wash. Univ., 128 S.
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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY V. CATALONA

A.

The Role of Informed Consent

At first glance, Moore, Greenberg, and Catalona are quite similar: in
all three cases, the courts were called upon to address ownership disputes
that arose as a result of biomedical research. 72 In fact, they are the only
published decisions that address this specific issue. 73 However, unlike the
other two cases, Catalona also involved the interpretation of both the
Common Rule and written consent forms. 74
In compliance with the Common Rule, Dr. Catalona and WU required
each research participant to complete an informed consent form. 75 While
the consent forms used in all the relevant research studies "generally" contained the same language, they "differed slightly" from study to study. 76 In
fact, the district court admitted into evidence fifteen different versions of
the consent form, which had been used for six different research studies. 77
As the district court noted, the consent forms "typically": (1) stated that the
research participant could not "'claim ownership rights' to any medical or
scientific product that results from research with the sample"; (2) used the
term "'donate' to characterize the delivery of the sample"; and (3) stated
that "'[y]our participation is voluntary and you may choose not to participate in this research study or withdraw your consent at any time."', 78 Notably, most consent forms also stated that, by participating in the study, the
research participant "'agree[s] to waive any claim [he] might have to the
79
body tissue that [he] donate[s]."',
Ct. 1122 (2008) (No. 07-521), 2008 WL 55107.
72. See generally Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006); Greenberg v.
Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Moore v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
73. See Blue, supra note 11, at 108-12 (reviewing only Moore, Greenberg, and Catalona in a
discussion of the case law regarding removed human body parts or biological material that is used for
research purposes).
74. See Catalona,437 F. Supp. 2d at 998.
75. Id. at 990.
76. Id.
77. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 671 n.3 (8th Cir. 2007).
78. Catalona,437 F. Supp. 2d at 990. Despite OHRP's disapproval of informed consent language
that exculpates a contributor from sharing in the commercialization of any products developed from her
tissue, see OHRP Letter to U of M, supra note 69, at 2, some of the consent forms in Catalonastate that
the contributor "waives his 'rights to any interest in products commercialized as a result of this research."' Post Hearing Brief of Patient/Defendants at 11, Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985
(E.D. Mo. 2006) (No. 4:03 CV-1065 SNL), 2005 WL 3623796.
79. Catalona, 490 F.3d at 671. It should be noted that only the Eighth Circuit addressed the fact
that this statement typically appeared in the consent forms. While the district court extensively detailed
the consent forms' language, see Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 990, it seemingly saw this particular
language as irrelevant.
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In addition to the consent forms, the research participants also received and signed the WU Genetic Research Brochure. 80 One of the most
noteworthy statements in the brochure is: "'You will receive no monetary
payment for your tissue nor can you claim ownership rights to any medical
or scientific product that resultsfrom research with your tissue.' 8 1 The
brochure also informed the contributors of "their right to have their biological materials destroyed upon request should they change their minds about
' 82
participating in the research study."
B.

The Eighth Circuit'sDecision

The Eighth Circuit framed the issue in Catalona as follows:
"[W]hether individuals who make an informed decision to contribute their
biological materials voluntarily to a particular research institution for the
purpose of medical research retain an ownership interest allowing the individuals to direct or authorize the transfer of such materials to a third party." 83
In addressing this issue, the court first turned to Missouri common
law, "which defines an inter vivos gift as 'a voluntary transfer of property
by the owner to another, without any consideration or compensation as an
incentive or motive for the transaction.' 84 To prove the existence of an
inter vivos gift, the party claiming the existence of the gift-WU, in this
case-must show by clear and convincing evidence 85 that (1) the donorthe research participants, in this case-had "present intent" to make a gift;
(2) the donor delivered the property to the donee; and (3) the donee accepted the gift, and the donee's ownership took effect "immediately and
86
absolutely."
Under the first element of the inter vivos gift test, the court held that
"the circumstances surrounding the [research participants'] decisions to
participate in genetic cancer research demonstrate . .. their intent to make
gifts of their biological materials to WU's medical research activities."' 87 In
80. Catalona,437 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
81. Catalona,490 F.3d at 671 (emphasis added).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 673.
84. Id. at 674 (citing Pilkington v. Wheat, 51 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Mo. 1932)).
85. The district court stated that "[t]he person claiming that the gift exists has the burden of proving it with clear, cogent and convincing evidence." Catalona,437 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (citing In re True,
285 B.R. 405, 414 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002); In re Estate of Campbell, 939 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997); Duvall v. Henke, 749 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)).
86. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d at 674 (citing Clippard v. Pfefferkorn, 168 S.W.3d 616,
618 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)).
87. Id.
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reaching this conclusion, the court relied on many aspects of the circumstances surrounding the contributors' participation, such as the fact that they
signed consent forms that (1) bore WU's logo; (2) characterized their participation as a "donation" and "a free and generous gift"; and (3) emphasized that their participation was voluntary and that they had the right to
88
decline participation in the study or to withdraw consent at any time.
The only mention of the second element in the court's opinion was a
brief statement that the court felt an analysis of this element was unwarranted: "The [research participants] unquestionably delivered their biological materials to WU at the time of their donation; thus, we focus our
'89
inquiry on the first and third elements."
The court held that WU satisfied the third element of the inter vivos
gift test because WU had "accepted and retained absolute possession of the
biological materials immediately upon donation." 90 The contributors argued that their ability to withdraw consent to the researchers' use of their
samples at any time precluded any absolute acceptance of possession. 9 1
However, the court held that "an inter vivos gift nevertheless may be subject to a condition allowing the donor to exercise a particular revocation
right in the future. The attachment of a condition to a charitable donation of
property does not negate or void an otherwise valid inter vivos gift."' 92 Further, after addressing the relevant provisions in the consent forms and brochures, the court held that the contributors "did not retain the right to
revoke and physically repossess the donated biological materials. '9 3 The
court appeared to have based this conclusion on the fact that the consent
forms and brochures did not contain language specifically granting contributors the right to revoke their biological materials, but rather entitled them
to request that their biological materials no longer be used and, thus, destroyed upon request. 94 Finally, the court stated in a footnote that, because
the research participants clearly made an inter vivos gift, it was "unnecessary to address the effect or validity of the consent forms' waiver language." 9 5

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 674.
Id.
Id. at 675.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 675 n.7.
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C.

Critiqueof the Eighth Circuit'sDecision

The Eighth Circuit correctly concluded that human biological material
is property, and that it should be governed by property law. 96 However,
many of the other findings by the Eighth Circuit are questionable, beginning with the way it framed the issue in the case. 97 Like the Greenberg
court, 9 8 the Eighth Circuit classified the research participants as willing
donors. 99 However, as explained below, the contributors did not willingly
donate their biological material; 100 in fact, the research participants consistently argued that they never intended to give up any ownership rights in
their samples. 101
In addition, this note argues that the Eighth Circuit erred in two ways:
(1) it incorrectly concluded that the research participants made valid inter
vivos gifts under Missouri common law, because the research participants
did not intend to make a gift and deliver their materials to WU, and WU
did not accept absolute ownership over the contributors' biological materials; and (2) even if the court was correct that the participants' contributions constituted valid inter vivos gifts, such a conclusion was precluded by
federal regulations.
1. The Eighth Circuit's conclusions are erroneous under
Missouri common law.
a.

The researchparticipantsdid not "intend to make a gift."

The court noted that, while the circumstances surrounding the transfer
may create an inference of a donor's present intent, "the donor must intend
'to part with his right in and dominion over the property immediately and
irrevocably."'" 102 While the contributors may have intended to part with
96. See Leonard Glantz et al., Rules for Donations to Tissue Banks-What Next?, 358 NEW ENG.
J.MED. 298, 302 (2008) (observing that the court clarified the legal status of the human body by recognizing it as property). In Moore, for instance, the Supreme Court of California determined that Moore's
biological material was not his property. 793 P.2d 479, 488-89 (Cal. 1990). Likewise, the Greenberg
court stated that "the property right in blood and tissue samples... evaporates once the sample is
voluntarily given to a third party." 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1075 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
97. See Catalona, 490 F.3d at 673. For the actual language used by the court, see supra text
accompanying note 83.
98. See Gitter, supra note 13, at 335; id. at 337 ("[A)lthough the [Greenberg] court relied upon the
notion of voluntary donation by the plaintiffs, this justification proves to be entirely fictional when one
considers that the plaintiffs were unaware of the true use of their tissue, largely because they did not
have the benefit of informed consent.").
99. See Catalona,490 F.3d at 673.
100. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.a.
101. Rao, supranote 15, at 374.
102. Catalona,490 F.3d at 674 (quoting Ridenour v. Duncan, 246 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Mo. 1952)).
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their samples in a physical sense, in that they did not expect to physically
repossess their samples, they may not have intended to irrevocably part
with the right to retain ownership and control over their samples. 103 Furthermore, the fact that the research participants could withdraw consentand even request destruction of their samples-at any time 104 could have
reasonably led them to believe that they were not irrevocably giving up
their rights in and dominion over their samples. 105
In addition, under Missouri law, the state of mind of an alleged donor
is relevant to determining his intent. 106 Richard Ward, one of the eight
contributor-defendants, testified at the district court hearing that he had
researched his reserved right to withdraw his sample, and that he did not
believe he was giving up all his rights to his tissue. 107 Likewise, contributor-defendant Tom McGurk testified that he did not intend for WU to own
his tissue, nor did WU ever inform him that they would assert ownership
over his sample. 10 8 In contrast, WU did not present any witnesses who
disputed the research participants' clear intentions at the time they provided
their tissue. 109
Finally, many of the contributors' samples in the GU Biorepository
were initially transferred there from another biobank. I10 Thus, these participants also may have reasonably inferred that they retained the right to
control WU's future possession of their biological materials, as they did
prior to their transfer to WU. "11 Accordingly, rather than intending to make
an irrevocable donation to WU, the participants' intentions may have been
more akin to a conditionalgrant of use to WU. 112 Therefore, the court mistakenly concluded that WU established by clear and convincing evidence

103. See infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
104. See supratext accompanying notes 78 and 82.
105. See Catalona, 490 F.3d at 674 ("The consent form emphasized the voluntariness of the [research participant's] participation and discussed [their] right to ...withdraw consent at any time.");
Glantz etal., supra note 96, at 302 (explaining that, if the contributors had given WU an unconditional
gift, as WU argued, the contributors could not have discontinued their participation at any time). Furthermore, as contributor James Ellis testified, "[y]ou don't have the right to withdraw if
you've.., given a gift, if you've donated in that sense ..."Transcript of Hearing at vol. 1, 168, Wash.
Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (No. 4:03-CV-1065 SNL).
106. See LeMehaute v. LeMehaute, 585 S.W.2d 276, 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
107. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 105, vol. 2, at 71.
108. Id. vol. l, at211.
109. Brief of Appellant-Defendants Richard Ward, et al. at 37, Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d
667 (8th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-2286, 06-2301), 2006 WL 2180106 [hereinafter Brief of AppellantDefendants].
110. Andrews, supra note 30, at 402.
Ill. ld.
112. See id. at 401, 402 (noting that this conclusion is especially possible in light of the fact that the
consent forms repeatedly refer to the contributors' tissue as "your tissue").
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that the participants intended to make an unconditional donation of their
biological material to WU.
b.

The researchparticipantsdid not "deliver" their biological materials
to Washington University.

Next, the court improperly concluded that the research participants
"unquestionably delivered their biological materials to WU at the time of
their donation." 113 In fact, this was the only statement evidencing the
court's treatment of the second element of the inter vivos gift test. Perhaps
the court assumed that the samples were "unquestionably delivered" to WU
l1 4
because the biological materials were housed in the GU Biorepository,
15
which was located in WU's facilities. 1 Nevertheless, whether the research
participants delivered their samples to WU was actually one of the unsettled issues before the court, as the contributors alleged that they had delivered their samples to Dr. Catalona, not WU.116 Therefore, it was
improper for the court to gloss over this contested issue without explaining
how WU satisfied this element by clear and convincing evidence.
c.

Washington University did not "accept absolute ownership"
of the biologicalmaterials.

Even if the court's conclusion that WU successfully satisfied the first
two elements of the test was correct, WU still did not show by clear and
convincing evidence that the participants made valid inter vivos gifts, because WU did not accept absolute ownership of their biological materials.
In concluding that WU accepted and retained absolute ownership of the
samples upon donation, the court made two critical errors--one involving
the court's focus on possession,'1 17 the other regarding the court's underlying conclusion that WU's acceptance was absolute. 118
First, WU's possession of the contributors' biological materials does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that WU owned the samples.11 9 Pos113. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir. 2007).
114. Id. at 671-72.
115. Id.at 670.
116. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 998 (E.D. Mo. 2006). For instance, James
Ellis, one of the eight contributor-defendants, testified at the district court hearing that he did not give
his tissue to WU. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 105, vol. 1, at 158.
117. See Blue, supra note 11, at 110-11 ("[T]he court in Catalonaequated [WU's] possession and
control over the research samples with ownership under state law and concluded that [WU] owned and
controlled the removed samples.").
118. See Catalona,490 F.3d at 675.
119. See State v. Hughes, 702 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that, under Missouri law, a person can retain legal or "constructive" possession of property even if another person or
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session alone does not require a finding that a gift has been made unless
there is "an intention to give";120 and, as already established, the participants did not intend to make a gift to WU. 12 1 Furthermore, possession is
merely one of the many manifestations or incidents in the "bundle of
rights" that constitutes property ownership. 122 As Professor Julia Mahoney
notes, "[p]roperty is a flexible concept, not an all-or-nothing one. ' 123 In
fact, under basic property law principles, multiple parties may have an
interest in the same piece of property. 124 Accordingly, it would be possible
for WU to have a possessory interest in the contributors' samples, while the
contributors retained their ownership interest in their biological material. 125
Therefore, WU's physical possession of the research participants' samples
was not dispositive, and the court improperly focused on possession in
concluding that the participants had made an inter vivos gift.
Second, the court erred in concluding that WU had accepted absolute
ownership of the participants' biological materials. 126 The court justified
this conclusion, in part, by rejecting the participants' argument that the
attachment of a condition upon the transfer precluded the transfer from
being construed as a gift, stating that "an inter vivos gift nevertheless may
be subject to a condition allowing the donor to exercise a particular revocation right in the future. The attachment of a condition to a charitable donation of property does not negate or void an otherwise valid inter vivos
gift."'127 However, the court apparently disregarded the fact that the condientity has "actual" or "physical" possession of the property).
120. Michaelson v. Wolf, 261 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Mo. 1953).
121. See discussion supra Part l.C.l.a.
122. See MOE LiTMAN & GERALD ROBERTSON, The Common Law Status of Genetic Material, in
LEGAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN GENETIC MATERIAL 51, 62 (Bartha Maria Knoppers et al. eds., 1996); see
also Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991) ("The concept of 'property' in the law
is extremely broad and abstract. The legal definition of 'property' most often refers not to a particular
physical object, but rather to the legal bundle of rights recognized in that object. Thus, 'property' is
often conceptualized as a 'bundle of rights."'); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 21-22 (1913) (describing property as a
complex aggregate of rights, privileges, and powers).
123. Mahoney, supranote 10, at 202.
124. One example of such a mutual property interest is the concept of "joint tenancy." See Melanie
Baird, Note, When and Why Does What Belong to Whom? A Proposed Model for the International
Protectionof Human Donorsof Biological Material,32 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 331, 346 (2006) (citing Recent
Case, Guomundsdottir v. Iceland, No. 151/2003 (Nov. 23, 2007) (Ice.), 118 HARv. L. REV. 810, 815-17
(2004)).
125. See id.; Mahoney, supra note 10, at 202. Elaborating on an analogy used by Professor Andrews, see Andrews, supra note 30, at 401, consider what happens when a son borrows his father's car.
Although the son temporarily has a possessory interest in the car, his possession does not also give him
an ownership interest in the car; rather, the father is still the owner of his car.
126. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 675 (8th Cir. 2007).
127. Id. (citations omitted). The court also cited hazardous waste laws to support its conclusion that
the research participants made an absolute gift to WU, stating that WU's acceptance of the materials
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tion in this case was one of control. Certainly, conditioning a transfer upon
the right to retain control over the transferred material-even to the point
where the contributor may request its destruction-may very well "negate
or void an otherwise valid inter vivos gift."'1 2 8 In fact, in no other case has a
court determined that a gift has been made, giving absolute ownership to
another party, when the alleged donor retained the right to destroy the
property in question.
2.

The Eighth Circuit's conclusions are precluded by the Common Rule.

Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ...shall be the supreme Law of the Land."' 129 The Supreme Court of the United States has
stated that "[i]t is a familiar and well-established principle that the Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that 'interfere with, or are contrary to,'
federal law."' 13 0 Furthermore, federal regulations-like federal statutesmay preempt conflicting state common law rules, as well as state legislation. 13 1 Therefore, to the extent that Missouri's inter vivos gift law 132 conflicts or interferes with the Common Rule, the Common Rule takes
precedent. 133 Accordingly, even if the research participants in Catalona
made valid inter vivos gifts under Missouri common law, the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that WU is the sole owner of the samples is precluded by
was absolute, in part because hazardous waste laws prohibited the participants from physically repossessing their excised biological material. Id. at 676. This is rather weak support for the court's conclusion, however, because at no time did the research participants request to have their biological materials
returned to them, and they never asserted that they retained any such right.
128. See id. at 675. Under Missouri common law, an inter vivos gift cannot be made "where the
donor reserves, either expressly or in the circumstances, the power of revocation or dominion over the
subject of the gift." Cartall v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 153 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Mo. 1941); see also
Donnelly v. Donnelly, 951 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) ("[O]nce a gift is made the donor may
not revoke the gift upon a change of mind.").
129. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
130. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985) (citation
omitted) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824)); see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (explaining that federal law preempts state law when the state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress").
131. See HillsboroughCounty, 471 U.S. at 713; see also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861, 881 (2000).
132. See, e.g., Clippard v. Pfefferkom, 168 S.W.3d 616, 618 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
133. See Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 712-13. While there is an exception to the Common
Rule's preemption of state law, the exception applies only if the applicable state law imposes "additional protections" to human subjects. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(f) (2007). In this case, the conflicting state law is
Missouri's inter vivos gift law, which does not provide research participants with additional protections.
See, e.g., Clippard, 168 S.W.3d at 618. Thus, the exception did not apply in this case. See Grimes v.
Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 849 (Md. 2001) (holding that the informed consent provisions of the Common Rule preempted conflicting state law, which did not provide greaterprotection to
research participants than did the Common Rule).
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the federal regulations' ban on contributors waiving any of their legal
134
rights, such as the fight to retain ownership of their biological materials.
In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States stated in a 2007
opinion that "an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is 'controlling' unless 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with' the regulations being
interpreted."' 13 5 Thus, if the Eighth Circuit found that the regulations were
ambiguous, because they do not explicitly state that the right of ownership
is a legal right that a contributor cannot waive, the court should have resolved the ambiguity by looking to OHRP's interpretations of the Common
36

Rule. 1

Overall, the Eighth Circuit improperly concluded that WU satisfied its
burden of proving all three required elements of the inter vivos gift test by
clear and convincing evidence. First, there was significant evidence that the
research participants did not intend to irrevocably relinquish their ownership and control over their biological materials, and, therefore, that they did
not intend to make an absolute gift. 13 7 Second, the court did not provide
any reasoning to support its conclusion that the research participants delivered their biological material to WU.138 Finally, there was significant

evidence that WU did not accept absolute ownership of the research participants' biological material, such as the fact that the participants could request the destruction of their samples at any time. 139 And, in any event, the
Supremacy Clause precluded the Eighth Circuit from finding that the research participants had made valid inter vivos gifts under Missouri common law, since that state law conflicts with the Common Rule's
40
exculpatory language prohibition. 1
134. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116; see also Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 712-13; Grimes, 782 A.2d
at 849.
135. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2349 (2007) (quoting Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)) (holding that, where "an agency's course of action indicates that
the interpretation of its own regulation reflects its considered views ... we have accepted that interpretation as the agency's own, even if the agency set those views forth in a legal brief'); see also Geier,
529 U.S. at 883 ("The agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own regulation and its
objectives and is 'uniquely qualified' to comprehend the likely impact of state requirements."). The
Eighth Circuit itself had previously held that, under principles of administrative law, an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to substantial deference, and may even be considered "determinative authority." See Glover v. Standard Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953, 962-63 (8th Cir. 2002).
136. See Coke, 127 S. Ct. at 2349. Two of OHRP's interpretations that were available at the time of
the Eighth Court's decision included OHRP's guidance topic on exculpatory language, see Exculpatory
Language Guidance Topic, supra note 67, and OHRP's letter to LSU, see OHRP Letter to LSU, supra
note 69, at 1.
137. See supra Part II.C.l.a.
138. See supra Part II.C.I.b.
139. See supra Part II.C. l.c.
140. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 16-17, Ward v. Wash. Univ., 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008)
(No. 07-521), 2007 WL 3071024.
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III. REFORMING THE COMMON RULE
According to the Eighth Circuit in Catalona, contributors do not "retain the right to direct or authorize the use, transfer, or destination of [their]
biological materials" after their contribution. 14 1 Rather, the court held that
research participants' "subsequent rights to their biological materials [are]
expressly limited to the option to discontinue participation in the study to
avoid answering more questions, donating more biological materials, or
allowing their biological materials to be used for further research."' 14 2 By
recognizing only these extremely limited rights, the Catalonadecision has
left human contributors of biological material largely unprotected and vulnerable to the goals of researchers, institutions, and biotechnology firms. 14 3
Part III of this note illustrates the need for federal reform by identifying the insufficiencies and consequences of the current regulations governing the protection of research participants. In addition, this Part will
propose recommendations for regulatory reform that will both effectively
enable the advancement of scientific and medical research, and ensure that
the rights and interests of human contributors of biological material are
more fully protected.
A.

The Needfor Reform

Although legislation to amend the Common Rule has been introduced
in every session of Congress since 1997,144 the regulations remain exactly

141. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 675 (8th Cir. 2007).
142. Id.
143. It is important to note at this point that many, or even most researchers likely have a strong
moral character, and are trying to advance science and medicine for the good of society. However, as
journalist Rebecca Skloot noted about her interview with biomedical researcher Anna O'Connell, "she
wanted to make one thing clear: scientists aren't out to deceive people about their tissues. 'We genuinely want to gather as much information as we can to advance research. The problem is,
in all that excitement, sometimes scientists don't think about consequences."' Skloot, supra note 8, at 41 (quoting
Anna O'Connell).
144. WILLIAMS, supra note 51, at Summary. One notable example of this proposed legislation is
the Protection for Participants in Research Act of 2003, which would have, in effect, extended the reach
of the Common Rule and other subparts of 45 C.F.R. part 46 to all research, whether publicly or privately funded. See H.R. 3594, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003). Additionally, the Act would have required
researchers to provide contributors with information on how to contact OHRP to submit questions about
their rights or to report concerns about certain research. Id. Furthermore, the Act would have required
the HHS Secretary to publish a determination in the Federal Register, specifying whether there were
"circumstances in which research that studie[d] human tissue or other types of clinical specimens," or
that did not "involve any interaction or intervention with a living human" should have been "considered
human subject research." Id. Finally, under the Act, "the HHS Secretary would have been required to
establish expanded informed consent criteria that provided for 'the provision of full and complete
information relevant to the research to a prospective human subject."' WILLIAMS, supra note 51, at 2425 (quoting H.R. 3594 § 2).
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as they were after the 1981 revisions. 14 5 In contrast, the landscape of bio46
medical research has seen extensive changes. 1
Traditionally, a research study occurred at a single location, such as an
academic institution, and was largely federally funded. 14 7 Additionally,
researchers would ask participants to provide a sample for one particular
purpose, such as trying to understand the genetic basis of a specific disease. 148 In these situations, researchers could more easily fulfill their legal
obligation to inform potential contributors of the risks and benefits of par49
ticipating in the research. 1
Current practices are vastly different, however. Researchers are usually not aware of the potential research for which they may use collected
samples, because much of the future research is dependent on the outcomes
of the studies for which the samples are initially requested. 150 As a result,
researchers now commonly obtain biological material from contributors
using practices known as "blanket consent" or "prospective authorization," 15 1 enabling them to store vast amounts of tissue for future research,
the topic and scope of which are yet to be determined. 152 However, as Professor Hank Greely explains, when researchers use blanket consent,
"[p]otential subjects cannot be informed of the specific risks and benefits of
the research because the biobanks do not know what those risks and benefits may be; they do not even know what the research topics will be." 153
145. See WILLIAMS, supra note 51, at 14; Greely, supra note 6, at 349 (citations omitted) ("Criticisms and suggestions for reform have continued, but the legal and ethical frameworks have not been
reformed.").
146. See WILLIAMS, supra note 51, at 16.
147. Id. at 10.
148. Greely, supra note 6, at 357.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. "Blanket consent" and "prospective authorization" are terms used to describe a type of "informed" consent, whereby researchers provide research participants with general information on foreseeable risks and benefits of their contribution, but provide no information about the particular research
that may eventually be conducted on the research participants' biological materials. Id. at 358; see also
NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 49. Insituations where researchers request blanket consent, contributors are essentially giving researchers "open-ended permission" to use their biological material for
undetermined future research projects. David E. Winickoff & Richard N. Winickoff, The Charitable
Trust as a Modelfor Genomic Biobanks, 349 N. ENG. J. MED. 1180, 1180 (2003).
152. Greely, supra note 6, at 357; see also Andrews, supra note 12, at 25 ("Changes in the culture
of research since the adoption of the federal regulations also prompt concerns that were not envisioned
at the time the informed consent exemption in 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) was enacted.").
153. Greely, supra note 6, at 357; see also Buchanan, supra note 17, at B-18 ("[T]he difference
between blanket consent and what is ordinarily understood by informed consent is so great that it is
problematic even to use the same term, 'consent,' to refer to both."). Occasionally, researchers ascertain
contributors' preferences regarding the type of research they are comfortable having performed on their
samples; however, if and when individuals' wishes are discovered, "this is done as a courtesy, rather
than as a recognition of patients' rights to prohibit the use of their tissues for purposes of which they
disapprove." R. Alta Charo, Body of Research--Ownership and Use of Human Tissue, 355 N. ENG. J.
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Supporters of the status quo argue that reforming the law governing
human subjects research is unnecessary because contributors are already
sufficiently protected. 154 Academic research institutions argue that they are
held strictly accountable for ensuring the welfare of contributors through
the mandates of the Common Rule, OHRP enforcement, and their own
institutional policies. 155 But what these institutions have not recognized is
that, even if OHRP's enforcement of the Common Rule were up to par
(which it doubtful at this time), 15 6 the outdated Common Rule still would
not fully protect the rights and interests of contributors. In other words,
because the Common Rule was drafted "to govern research on living,
breathing humans, not their disembodied tissues," as writer Rebecca Skloot
observes, 15 7 it fails to protect contributors of biological material from potentially significant nonphysical or psychosocial harm. 15 8 For instance, a
contributor could feel harmed or wronged by the stigmatization of his racial
1 59
or ethnic group that results from research using his biological material.
Similarly, a contributor may be harmed or wronged when her biological
material is used in a manner that violates her moral or religious beliefs. 16 0
MED. 1517, 1518 (2006).
154. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Cornell University et al. in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee and
Affirmance at 18-25, Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-2286, 06-2301),
2006 WL 2703704.
155. Id.
156. Despite what appears to be a comprehensive enforcement scheme, Professor Greely asserts
that OHRP's enforcement of the Common Rule "is currently of doubtful efficacy." Greely, supra note
6, at 353.
157. Skloot, supra note 8, at 45.
158. See Greely, supra note 6, at 349 ("The Common Rule... has done a decent job of protecting
research subjects from physical risks, but has largely ignored the fact that research subjects may have
other interests they care about."); see also Buchanan, supra note 17, at B-16 ("[T]he requirement of
informed consent developed as a safeguard against very tangible harms-the sorts of physical harms
that the law generally regards as batteries.").
159. See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 45-46; Alpert, supra note 5, at A-17 to A-18 (quoting
Larry Gostin, Ethical Principles for the Conduct of Human Subject Research: Population-Based Research and Ethics, 19 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 191, 197 (1991)) (arguing that, if research results in
information that stigmatizes certain groups, it can "'cause intangible hurt to groups such as lowering
their self-esteem or racial or cultural pride. Derogatory information about a sub-population can stigmatize and wound its people as much as breaches of confidentiality can affect an individual."').
160. See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 49 ("For example, for religious or cultural reasons, some
may believe that their biological materials should not be used in contraceptive research or in studies that
are aimed at identifying individuals who are prone to violence or other socially unacceptable behaviors."). In addition, the brochure given to the research participants in Catalona notified them that, "[i]f
this information were to become known outside of the research, you (and family members) may be
unable to obtain health, life, or disability insurance. You might also be refused employment or be
terminated from your current employment." Brief of Appellant-Defendants, supra note 109, at 55. For a
discussion of other nonphysical harms that may result from biomedical research, such as group harms
and familial conflicts, see NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at ch. 4. For a discussion of the issues that
biomedical research raises in various religions, see Courtney S. Campbell, Research on Human Tissue:
Religious Perspectives, in 2 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at C-I.

CHICAGO-KENTLAW REVIEW

[Vol 84:1

Furthermore, Professor Jordan Paradise and Professor Lori Andrews noted
that contributors can feel harmed if their biological material is used for
research without their consent (as in Moore), 161 beyond their consent (as in
Catalona),162 or for purposes with which they do not approve (as in
Greenberg, where researchers used contributors' samples for commercial
gain). 163
The recent case involving the Native American Havasupai tribe illustrates the Common Rule's inability to adequately protect contributors from
such psychosocial harm. Members of the Havasupai tribe gave hundreds of
blood samples to researchers at Arizona State University (ASU) for diabetes research, because members of the Havasupai tribe-like the majority of the Native American population-suffer from an inordinately high
incidence rate of type 2 diabetes. 164 Over the next several years, the ASU
researchers attempted to find genetic associations with diabetes, consistent
with the uses for which the research participants consented. 165 However, in
a lawsuit filed against ASU and the individual researchers in 2004, the
Havasupai research participants asserted that, without permission, the researchers also used their samples to study schizophrenia, inbreeding, and
166
the history and migration of the Havasupai people to North America.
161. Jordan Paradise & Lori Andrews, Tales from the Crypt: Scientific, Ethical,and Legal Considerations for Biohistorical Analysis of Deceased Historical Figures, 26 TEMP. J. SC. TECH. & ENVTL. L.
223, 262 (2007) (citing Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 486 (Cal. 1990)).
162. Id. (citing Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir. 2007)).
163. Id. (citing Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1066-67 (S.D. Fla. 2003)). In its Institutional Review Board (IRB) Guidebook published in 1993,
OPRR-the predecessor of OHRP, see supra note 60-recognized the unique concerns raised by
biomedical research, as opposed to more "typical" scientific research:
Unlike the risks presented by many biomedical research protocols considered by IRBs, the
primary risks involved in... genetic research are risks of social and psychological harm, rather than risks of physical injury. Genetic studies that generate information about subjects'
personal health risks can provoke anxiety and confusion, damage familial relationships, and
compromise the subjects' insurability and employment opportunities. For many genetic research protocols, these psychosocial risks can be significant enough to warrant careful IRB
review and discussion. The fact that genetic studies are often limited to the collection of family history information and blood drawing should not, therefore, automatically classify them as
"minimal risk" studies ....
OFFICE FOR PROTECTION FROM RES. RISKS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROTECTING

HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK, ch. 5, § H (1993), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/irb/irb-chapter5ii.htm#hl 2 [hereinafter IRB GUIDEBOOK].
164. Andrews, supra note 2, at 27 ("The Havasupai have one of the highest incidences of type 2
diabetes anywhere in the world: Over half the women and more than one-third of the men have it.").
165. Id.
166. Id.; Andrews, supra note 30, at 405; Greely, supra note 6, at 358. See generally Havasupai
Tribe v. Ariz. State Univ. Bd. of Regents, No. S-0300-CV-20040146 (Coconino County Super. Ct. filed
Mar. 12, 2004); Tilousi v. Ariz. State Univ. Bd. of Regents, No. S-0300-CV-2004-0115 (Coconino
County Super. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 2004). For a discussion of the procedural history and current disposition of these cases, see Julie A. Burger, What is Owed Participantsin Biotechnology Research?, 84
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 55, 73 n.108 (2009).
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The tribe alleges that the schizophrenia and inbreeding research has stigmatized them, and that they never would have consented to the migration stu167
dies, because they directly conflict with their religious beliefs.
According to Professor Greely, the Havasupai case "indicate[s] that, at
least in some circumstances, research subjects can be very unhappy about
16 8
uses of their samples and data they did not know about and did not like."
The Common Rule was designed to protect human research subjects
from harm, 169 but it is becoming less able to do so as it becomes increasingly outdated. 170 And, as Catalona illustrates, contributors of biological
material cannot even turn to the courts to enforce whatever protections the
regulations afford them. 171 Therefore, because the Common Rule is cur172
rently failing to fulfill its purpose, reform is essential.

B.

Recommendationsfor Reform

1. The Common Rule applies to research using human biological
material.
The Common Rule currently states that it applies to "all research involving human subjects,"' 173 and it defines a "human subject" as "a living
individual about whom an investigator.., conducting research obtains (1)
[d]ata through intervention or interaction with the individual, or (2)
[i]dentifiable private information."' 174 Based on the regulations' definitions
167. Andrews, supra note 2, at 27; Andrews, supra note 30, at 405.
168. Greely, supra note 6, at 358.
169. See id. at 356.
170. See Andrews, supra note 12, at 25.
171. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Us TOO, International in Support of Petitioners at 20, Catalona v.
Wash. Univ., 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008) (Nos. 07-521, 07-525), 2007 WL 4132902 [hereinafter Brief of Us
TOO, International]. Us TOO, International is a "prostate cancer support organization founded in 1990
by prostate cancer survivors to serve prostate cancer patients and their families," and is "the only prostate cancer organization whose exclusive mission is to be the voice of patients." Id. at 1.
172. See Greely, supra note 6, at 349. Also, because societal views toward the ethical implications
of biomedical research are constantly evolving, continually reexamining and even amending the federal
research regulations is warranted. See Clayton et al., supra note 9, at 1787.
173. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2007).
174. The Common Rule's complete definition of a human subject is as follows:
(f) Human subject means a living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or student) conducting research obtains
(1) Data through intervention or interaction with the individual, or
(2) Identifiable private information.
Intervention includes both physical procedures by which data are gathered (for example, venipuncture) and manipulations of the subject or the subject's environment that are performed
for research purposes. Interaction includes communication or interpersonal contact between
investigator and subject.
Private information includes information about behavior that occurs in a context in which an
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of "intervention" and "interaction," 17 5 researchers who collect human biological material from contributors are conducting human subjects research. 176 However, confusion arises when a researcher uses human
biological material that was previously collected by another person-for
177
example, when researchers obtain or purchase samples from biobanks.
In this situation, the researcher using the biological material has not had
any direct contact-and therefore no intervention or interaction-with the
human contributor; as a result, this research is only governed by the Common Rule if it involves "identifiable private information."' 178 Since there is
essentially no doubt that biological material and its accompanying information about the contributor constitute "private information," the critical
179
question then becomes: are the samples "identifiable"?
In August 2004, OHRP issued a guidance document, purporting to
clarify the Common Rule's applicability to research involving "coded private information or human biological specimens."' 180 Notably, OHRP states
that it "does not consider research involving only coded private information
or specimens to involve human subjects" if the researcher is using previously collected samples or information, and if the researcher "cannot
readily ascertain the identity of the individual(s) to whom the coded private
information or specimens pertain."' 18 1 However, as Professor Greely explains, "coded information-and even anonymized 182 information-may
still allow the subject's identity to be 'readily ascertained by the investigator.'"1 83 Therefore, OHRP's rather convoluted and confusing interpretation
individual can reasonably expect that no observation or recording is taking place, and information which has been provided for specific purposes by an individual and which the individual can reasonably expect will not be made public (for example, a medical record). Private
information must be individually identifiable (i.e., the identity of the subject is or may readily
be ascertained by the investigator or associated with the information) in order for obtaining
the information to constitute research involving human subjects.
Id. § 46.102(t).
175. See id.
176. See Greely, supra note 6, at 354.
177. See id.
178. Id.; see 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f).
179. See Greely, supra note 6, at 354.
180. OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE
ON RESEARCH INVOLVING CODED PRIVATE INFORMATION OR BIOLOGICAL SPECIMENS 1, 1 (2004),

availableat http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/cdebiol.pdf.
181. Id. at 3. OHRP's issuance of this guidance document represented a "dramatic shift" in the
research community's position on this issue, as virtually all members of the community had previously
agreed that 1RBs had to at least consider whether it was necessary to obtain informed consent for
research using biological materials. Ellen Wright Clayton, So What Are We Going to Do About Research Using Clinical Information and Samples?, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 14,
14.
182. See infra Part III.B.5 and note 273.
183. Greely, supra note 6, at 355 (quoting 45 C.F.R § 46.102(f)).
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by no means precludes all-or even most-research involving human biological material from being covered by the Common Rule. 184 For instance,
this interpretation did not apply to the research conducted in Catalona,nor
does it apply to future uses of the contributors' samples, because the samples in the GU Biorepository contain DNA and, thus, are always going to
be identifiable. 185 Accordingly, Professor Greely recommends that biobanks assume that all their research is human subjects research that is governed by the Common Rule. 186 In fact, it appears as though the research
community itself believes that research using human biological material
falls within the ambit of the Common Rule, as demonstrated by the researchers requesting informed consent from the contributors in Catalona,
87
for example. 1
It becomes apparent from these various opinions and interpretations
that the most critical amendment is one clarifying that the Common Rule
applies to research conducted on human biological material. 18 8 Absent a
clear meaning of the Common Rule's scope, any other regulatory changes
that would otherwise protect the rights and interests of contributors would
be futile, and contributors of biological material would remain largely unprotected and vulnerable to nonphysical harm. 189 For example, if this type
of research is not governed by the Common Rule, researchers will not even
need to seek contributors' informed consent' 90-the most fundamental
requirement for ethical human subjects research. 19 1 Dr. Catalona testified
at the district court hearing that, if the contributors' samples were not governed by the Common Rule, the samples "could be licensed to a drug
company, they could be licensed to a biotech company, they could be sold
to another university, they could be used to study sexual predator behavior,
184. See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 17 ("[F]ew research samples are unidentifiable.").
185. See Andrews, supra note 30, at 404 (citing Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief at 10, Wash. Univ. v.
Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (No. 4:03-CV-1065 SNL), 2005 WL 3623795 ("Currently, the samples are still linked to participants' identities.")); infra notes 280-82 and accompanying
text.
186. Greely, supra note 6, at 355.
187. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 990 (E.D. Mo. 2006). Likewise, WU has
conceded that "[t]he Common Rule requires [WU] to obtain informed consent from individuals who
donate tissue samples for use in medical research." Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 4-5,
Catalona v. Wash. Univ., 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008) (Nos. 07-521, 07-525), 2007 WL 4466856 (citing 45
C.F.R. §§ 46.116-.117). More generally, numerous surveys reveal that most patients and research
participants believe that if their biological material is used in research, their consent should be required.
Clayton, supranote 181, at 14-15.
188. See Greely, supra note 6, at 356 ("Even if the failure to apply the protections of the Common
Rule or similar systems of human subjects protection to genomic biobanks were legal, it would not be
ethical").
189. See id.
190. See WILLIAMS, supra note 51, at 22; Clayton, supranote 181, at 14.
191. See Brief of Us TOO, International, supra note 171, at 11.
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alcoholism, criminal behavior, other diseases that these patients never intended to have their samples used for." 192 Therefore, to reduce the likelihood of these potentially harmful scenarios, it is imperative to clarify that
19 3
the Common Rule applies to research using human biological material.
2.

Contributors retain certain rights in their biological material.

Based on the Eighth Circuit's holding in Catalona, researchers may
legally ask contributors to give up nearly all property rights in their own
excised biological material. 194 But when this occurs, researchers are essentially given a free pass to use another person's biological material however
the researcherchooses, and to completely disregard the wishes of the sample's human source. Of course, it is important for researchers to be able to
use biological material in ways that will advance their knowledge and discovery. 195 However, if certain uses are unacceptable to the contributorfor any reason-it is unethical to nevertheless use the contributor's sample
96
in the name of medical progress. 1
According to NBAC, "[i]t stands to reason that a person's rights and
interests are better protected if that person has some form of control over
his or her removed biological material."' 197 Clearly, if contributors can
decide what can be done with their samples and who can do it, they will be
significantly more capable of avoiding harm and protecting their personal
dignity. 198 Thus, it is imperative to amend the Common Rule to allow the
192. Transcript of Hearing, supranote 105, vol. 1, at 158, 168.
193. See NBAC REPORT, supranote 1, at 68.
194. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 675 (8th Cir. 2007); Reply Brief in Support of
Certiorari at 1, Catalona v. Wash. Univ., 128 S.Ct. 1122 (2008) (No. 07-525), 2008 WL 65144. While
the court acknowledged that the research participants were expressly given the right to discontinue their
participation in the research, WU nevertheless overrode contributors' requests to withdraw. See Skloot,
supra note 8, at 75; infra text accompanying notes 272-74.
195. See supra note 17.
196. See Gitter, supra note 13, at 303 (quoting Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal.
Rptr. 494, 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd in part,rev 'd in part, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (en banc)).
197. NBAC REPORT, supra note 1,at 7; see Madison Powers, Justice and Genetics: Privacy Protection and the Moral Basis of Public Policy, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY INTHE GENETIC ERA 355, 357 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) ("[Tlhe individual has
less ability to take additional steps to mitigate potential adverse consequences... if he or she has ...no
ability to exercise continuing control of the samples."). For a thorough discussion of relevant, distinct
interests that weigh in favor of granting contributors substantial control over their sample, see Buchanan, supra note 17, at B-6 to B-12.
198. See Charles M. Jordan, Jr. & Casey J. Price, First Moore, Then Hecht: Isn't It Time We Recognize a Property Interest in Tissues, Cells, and Gametes?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 151, 168
(2002) ("[A] patients' [sic] pecuniary and dignitary interests will be much better protected than they are
today if the law extends and recognizes property rights in tissues and cells even after they are removed
from the body."); LITMAN & ROBERTSON, supra note 122, at 60 ("Indeed, as a general proposition, the
greater the control conferred on individuals in relation to their bodies, the greater the respect that is
being accorded to individuals.").
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human sources of biological material to retain meaningful control over
their samples. 199
One basic means of accomplishing this goal is by clarifying the exculpatory language prohibition in the Common Rule. 2 00 As with numerous
other Common Rule provisions, the meaning of the exculpatory language
prohibition has proven to be the basis of considerable uncertainty. 20 1 For
instance, some of the testimony given at the district court hearing in Catalona indicated that "the research community consistently understood 45
C.F.R. § 46.116 to bar exculpatory language involving releases from malpractice or other negligence. ' 202 Then again, guidance issued by OHRP
reveals a completely different interpretation: the examples of prohibited
exculpatory language listed in the guidance document make it extremely
clear that OHRP believes that contributors retain property rights in their
biological materials. 203 Furthermore, OHRP's letter to WU in November
2007 reveals that the exculpatory language prohibition does not merely bar
researchers from asking contributors to waive their right to bring negligence claims; rather, this letter illustrates that OHRP interprets this prohibition as barring the contributors from waiving any of their legal rights204
including the right to retain ownership over their samples.
Yet, as Catalona demonstrates, it is insufficient to only have agency
interpretations on this subject: while they are certainly authoritative, and
while the teachings of the Supreme Court of the United States establish that
courts are to view them as "controlling," 205 they nevertheless are not binding law. 206 Therefore, the Common Rule's provision prohibiting exculpatory language should be amended to include examples such as those provided
in OHRP's guidance document. 20 7 Ultimately, by clarifying the meaning of
199. See Jordan & Price, supra note 198, at 168.
200. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2007) ("No informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any
exculpatory language through which the subject or the representative is made to waive or appear to
waive any of the subject's legal rights .... ").
201. See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at ii.
202. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 998 (E.D. Mo. 2006). It should be noted,
however, that one of WU's own expert witnesses testified that the relevant language in WU's consent
forms was exculpatory within the meaning of 45 C.F.R. § 46.116. See Transcript of Hearing, supra note
105, at vol. 2, 169-71.
203. See Exculpatory Language Guidance Topic, supra note 67.
204. See Reply in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 71, at 4-5; OHRP Letter
to WU, supra note 70, at 4a. Interestingly, OHRP also stated in this letter (which was written after the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Catalona): "We believe that, to date, no jurisdictions have conclusively
determined that all human subjects have no legal rights in their excised biological material that is used
for research purposes." OHRP Letter to WU, supra note 70, at 5a.
205. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2349 (2007).
206. See Catalona,437 F. Supp. 2d at 998.
207. See Exculpatory Language Guidance Topic, supranote 67.
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the exculpatory language prohibition, the Common Rule will more effectively protect the rights and interests of the people who contribute their
20 8
biological material.
In addition, to ensure that the Common Rule fully protects human subjects, as it was designed to do, 209 it is essential to grant contributors the
right to control the type of research that is ultimately conducted on their
biological material. 2 10 Recognizing this basic form of property right in
one's excised bodily material is the most effective means of protecting
contributors from nonphysical harm, because contributors will be able to
protect themselves from incurring such harm. 21 1 To illustrate, if a Catalona
contributor did not want his prostate tissue to be used in a future WU research project to create a human clone, because human cloning violates his
moral beliefs, he would be able to prevent such a contravention of his beliefs with the right to control his sample. 2 12 Under the Catalona holding,
however, this contributor would essentially be forced to violate his personal
beliefs by being forced to participate in a human cloning research project
13
without his consent. 2
Those who oppose granting contributors the right to control the fate of
their biological material argue that doing so would thwart the progress of
biomedical research. 2 14 As WU argued, researchers and biobanks "could
no longer rely on aggregate collections of biological materials, because
'samples would come and go.' ' 2 15 Yet, there is no indication that allowing
contributors to retain ownership over their biological materials has hindered advancements in research. 2 16 For example, the OHRP guidance topic
that gives examples of prohibited exculpatory language was developed by a
208. See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 7; Gitter, supra note 13, at 304; Jordan & Price, supra
note 198, at 168.
209. See NBAC REPORT, supranote 1,at 68.
210. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) ("A
patient must have the ultimate power to control what becomes of his or her tissues. To hold otherwise
would open the door to a massive invasion of human privacy and dignity in the name of medical
progress."), aff'd in part, revd in part, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (en banc).
211. See NBAC Report, supra note 1,at 7.
212. For a discussion of Professor Greely's thoughtful suggestions on how contributors would be
able to control the fate of their excised biological material, see supra note 6, at 358-59, discussed infra
Part III.B.4.
213. See Brief of Us TOO, International, supra note 171, at 12.
214. See, e.g., Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, supra note 187, at 10.
215. Id.
216. Conversely, research advancements may be hindered if researchers do not have the necessary
samples to conduct their research, as a result of losing the trust of contributors. For instance, Professor
Gary Marchant observes that many Native American tribes are unlikely to contribute biological material
just "for the sake of not impeding the progress of genetic research" if doing so would render them
vulnerable to "incur the risk of social and political harms." Gary E. Marchant, Property Rights and
Benefit-Sharingfor DNA Donors?, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 153, 167 (2005).

20091

YOU DON'TOWNME

National Institutes of Health (NIH) Cooperative Oncology Chairpersons
group. 2 17 Thus, as Professor Andrews aptly observed, "[t]he fact that oncology researchers have indicated this is how they conduct their research
certainly undercuts [WU's] arguments that it would be harmful to research"
2
to allow contributors to control the use of their samples. 18
Critics may also argue that giving contributors this right is impracticable, 2 19 and that it would stifle biomedical research by imposing onerous
record-keeping requirements, for example. 220 At first thought, this seems to
be a reasonable argument: would biobank administrators really be able to
successfully track the specific wishes of each contributor? But, in fact,
individual samples of biological material are often accompanied by vast
amounts of clinical and demographic information, such as the contributor's
age, race, and detailed medical history. 22 1 For instance, the computer database that accompanies the biological material in the GU Biorepository contains "very detailed" "medical information for each particular patient that
provided samples. ' 222 Thus, as Professor Gitter noted, "in light of the 'meticulous care and planning necessary in serious modem medical research,"'
recording an additional item of data for each contributor is actually a rela223
tively minor undertaking.
Overall, implementing this change would greatly enhance the Common Rule's protection of contributors, without creating insurmountable
obstacles for future innovation. Then, if the Common Rule is successfully
amended to grant contributors this right, legislators could even consider
adding to contributors' retained rights, such as granting them the right to
specify where and by whom research on one's biological material may be
conducted.
217. See Exculpatory Language Guidance Topic, supra note 67; see also Andrews, supra note 30,
at 404.
218. Andrews, supra note 30, at 405. Similarly, the renowned Fox Chase Cancer Center in Philadelphia allows contributors to specify the types of studies in which researchers may use their biological
material. Skloot, supra note 8,at 45. Yet, logic provides that this institution would not maintain such a
practice if doing so was detrimental to its research goals.
219. SeeBlue, supranote II, at 117.
220. See Gitter, supra note 13, at 288-89.
221. See NBAC REPORT, supranote 1, at 2, 16.
222. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 105, at vol. 1,64; vol. 2, 112-13.
223. Gitter, supra note 13, at 289 (quoting Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr.
494, 508 n.14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (en banc)).
Arguing against contributors retaining the right to control the fate of their own biological material, Don
Clayton, a spokesman for WU,postulates that "if patients are able to 'reclaim' or 'redirect' their blood
and tissues, biobanks will become 'impossible to manage' and 'so burdensome that scientists will be
handcuffed."' Skloot, supra note 8, at 79 (quoting Don Clayton). Yet, biobanks already keep track of
vast amounts of samples, information, and other data-and they do not appear to have any difficulty
doing so. Thus, continuing communication with contributors in order to discern their wishes regarding
potential future uses of their samples likely would not present a significant burden.
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Contributors must give "fully informed" consent.

One of the possible causes of the dispute between WU, Dr. Catalona,
and the GU Biorepository contributors could have been the fact that the
contributors did not receive adequate information upon which to base their
decision to participate. 224 And this case is by no means an exception to
what typically occurs. 225 Such a lack of informed consent may be the result
of researchers' or institutions' deceptive or misleading practices, 226 or
simply their failure to recognize the various interests of the human sources
of biological material. 22 7 Regardless of the cause, it is clear that research
participants' bodily integrity and autonomy may not be protected if they
consent to contribute without first being informed of all the information
that would potentially influence their decision to contribute. 228 Accordingly, to help ensure the complete protection of contributors' rights and interests, it is crucial to perfect the fundamental informed consent process by
amending the Common Rule to require researchers to obtain fully informed
consent. 229
One element that is essential to contributors' ability to give fully informed consent is knowing whether, by contributing, they retain ownership
or control over their biological material. In Catalona, for example, the
Eighth Circuit attempted to bolster its conclusion that the research participants did not retain any ownership over their samples by stating: "[A]bsent
224. For example, none of the consent forms stated that WU would become the absolute owner of
the contributor's tissue, thereby preventing the research participant from exercising control over the use
of his sample. See Post Hearing Brief of Patient/Defendants, supra note 78, at 10-11.
225. See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 62 ("In [some] cases, for a variety of reasons, individuals
may not understand fully or may not have been given the opportunity to consider carefully how their
specimens may be used in the future.").
226. See Winickoff & Winickoff, supra note 151, at 1180; see also Charlotte H. Harrison, Neither
Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for Compensating Contributors of Human Tissue, 28 AM.
J.L. & MED. 77, 81 (2002) (noting that, within the current system, information is often "poorly distributed, if not concealed").
227. See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 47 ("A case can be made that current practices concerning human biological materials sometimes fail to treat persons with due respect, because researchers
may unintentionally be misleading regarding why materials are being gathered and the uses to which
the materials will be put.").
228. See NCI BEST PRACTICES, supra note 2, at 16; see also Blue, supra note I1, at 89 (noting that
detailed informed consent procedures allow research participants to exercise their "freedom of choice").
229. See Harrison, supra note 226, at 84; NCI BEST PRACTICES, supra note 2, at 16. The Common
Rule currently requires researchers to obtain "legally effective" informed consent from subjects before
involving them in human subjects research. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2008). Furthermore, this section of the
Common Rule lists eight "[b]asic elements of informed consent," id. § 16.116(a), as well as six "additional elements of informed consent," any one or more of which are required "when appropriate," id.
§ 46.116(b). Although these provisions ensure that certain basic information is provided to potential
research participants, the vagueness and incompleteness of the requirements enables researchers to
intentionally or unintentionally conceal additional information that may be material to the contributor's
decision to participate.
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from the record is any indication the [research participants] ever were informed they had the ability to direct the transfer of their samples to another
entity for research purposes. ' 230 Irrespective of the fact that this is not
strong support for the court's conclusion, this statement reveals that WU
did not advise the contributors of information that very well may have been
material to their decision. That is, just as the research participants were not
informed of their ability to direct the transfer of their materials, they also
were not informed of their inability to do so. 23 1 However, knowing that
WU would not allow the transfer of their samples was arguably material to
the contributors' decisions to participate, as illustrated by the fact that over
six thousand contributors requested to have WU transfer their samples to
Dr. Catalona at Northwestern. 232 In addition, WU never explicitly disclosed to the research participants that, by contributing, they would give up
all ownership rights in their excised biological material. 233 Yet, again, this
information clearly would have affected some-if not many-research
participants' decisions to contribute. 2 34 Accordingly, the Common Rule
should require researchers to unambiguously disclose this information to
potential research participants during the informed consent process.
Another essential element of fully informed consent is knowing that
researchers or other entities may profit from products developed from research on a contributor's biological material. 235 Many potential contribu230. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 676 (8th Cir. 2007).
23 1. The consent forms' silence on this issue may have been especially misleading to the research
participants whose samples were initially transferred to the GU Biorepository from another biobank.
See supranotes 110-11 and accompanying text.
232. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 993 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
233. The consent forms did state that, "'[b]y agreeing to participate in this study, you agree to
waive any claim you might have to the body tissues that you donate."' Catalona, 490 F.3d at 675-76
n.7. Despite the fact that WU technically was not allowed to include this statement in the consent forms,
see Exculpatory Language Guidance Topic, supra note 67, this language nevertheless did not unambiguously inform the research participants that WU would become the sole owner of their excised tissue,
as evidenced by the testimony of some of the contributors, for example, see supra text accompanying
notes 107-08.
234. The anger on the part of some contributor-defendants easily leads one to believe that, had they
known at the time of contribution what they know now, they would not have made the decision to
contribute their biological material. See Skloot, supra note 8, at 75 ('"I just wanted to help Dr. Catalona
cure prostate cancer .... 'Now who knows what's going on with that stuff.') (quoting contributordefendant Tom McGurk); id. ('Washington University is saying they own part of our bodies' ..... 'They're trying to preserve their financial interest over our lives and our kids' lives ... just
thinking about that makes me crazy."') (quoting contributor-defendant Richard Ward).
235. See Am. MED. ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, § E-2.08(2)-(3) (2000), available at
http://www.ama-assn.orglad-com/polfind/Hlth-Ethics.pdf (advising physicians to inform patients of
researchers' potential commercial gains from the patients' tissue, and prohibiting human tissue and its
products from being used for commercial purposes without the informed consent of the contributing
human source); Clayton et al., supranote 9, at 1789. Although the policy issues surrounding the idea of
contributors' entitlement to a portion of the profits is beyond the scope of this note, if researchers do not
intend to share their commercial gains with contributors, they should at least inform potential contribu-
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tors are uneasy about the thought of others profiting from their biological
material, 23 6 especially if this would violate the contributor's religious or
moral beliefs. Likewise, some individuals may feel that it is unjust for them
to be expected to contribute gratuitously when researchers and institutions
stand to make enormous commercial gains from these contributions. 237 In
fact, John Moore filed his lawsuit upon learning that researchers were earning millions of dollars from the cell line they created using his biological
material. 23 8 Therefore, because the prospect of commercialization may be
significant to potential contributors' decisions, the Common Rule should be
amended to require its disclosure as part of the informed consent
23 9
process.
Similarly, contributors should be told that, while research using their
biological material may lead to diagnoses, treatments, or even cures, their
access to these treatments may be restricted-for example, if the treatment
is patented. 24 0 The Greenbergcase illustrates just how devastating this can
be if contributors are not informed of this possibility beforehand. 24 1 The
plaintiffs in Greenberg argued that they never would have agreed to contribute their biological materials, and those of their children, if they knew that
the research could result in limited access to and affordability of Canavan
disease screening tests. 242 To avoid future instances of contributors feeling
tors of this. See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 51; Clayton et al., supra note 9, at 1791.
236. Ellen Wright Clayton, Informed Consent and Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 15, 19 (2005);
Linda B. Daniels, Comment, Commercialization of Human Tissues: Has Biotechnology Created the
Need for an Expanded Scope of Informed Consent?, 27 CAL. W. L. REv. 209, 227 (1990); see NBAC
REPORT, supranote 1, at 49.
237. See Gitter, supra note 13, at 281, 300; Michele Goodwin, Altruism's Limits: Law, Capacity,
and Organ Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REv. 305, 389 (2004) ("Very few would knowingly and
willingly participate in a scheme that uses their unique resources for others' private gain without any
compensation or charitable relief."); Marchant, supra note 216, at 165 ("[F]rom a fairness perspective,
the contributions of tissue donors should not be singled out as necessarily altruistic when every other
party involved in the research may profit financially from their contributions."); see also Blue, supra
note 11, at 89.
238. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 482 (Cal. 1990); Goodwin, supra
note 237, at 389 n.416.
239. Kevin L. J. Oberdorfer, Note, The Lessons of Greenberg:Informed Consent and the Protection
of Tissue Sources' Research Interests, 93 GEO. L.J. 365, 386 (2004) (arguing that the Common Rule
should require researchers to disclose reasonably foreseeable commercial interests to potential contributors when obtaining informed consent, in order to increase contributors' trust in researchers).
240. See Andrews, supra note 12, at 27-28 ("People whose tissue samples are solicited or used
should be given adequate information upon which to base their decision, including whether the use of
their present or past tissue samples will lead to patents-and, if so, it should be disclosed that such
patents can lead to higher cost diagnostics and treatments."); see also Gitter, supra note 13, at 313
(explaining that some of the commercial products developed from contributors' tissue "may be priced
beyond the reach of most consumers").
241. See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1068
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
242. See Oberdorfer, supranote 239, at 387.
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betrayed and deceived like this, the Common Rule should be amended to
243
require full disclosure of this type of information.
Of course, there are criticisms of increasing the requirements of informed consent. For instance, David Korn, the senior vice president of the
Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), recognizes that
"'consent feels nice,"' but argues that it "'diminishes the value of tissue.' ' 244 But even if there is some truth to this argument, concealing information from research participants in ways that sometimes approach
fraud 245 cannot be the answer; the desire to advance knowledge, even for
the benefit of society, cannot trump the integrity and deeply held personal
beliefs of the individuals who contribute to this research. 246 Moreover, in
an article commissioned by NBAC, Sheri Alpert argued that full disclosure
is one of the best ways that researchers can demonstrate their respect for
the subject-even if fully disclosing all this information costs the researcher some subjects. It is better for the integrity of the overall scientific research establishment to lose subjects by providing full information
than it is 247
to lose subjects because they lack trust in that research establishment.
Therefore, it is in the best interest of both potential contributors and
the biological research community to amend the Common Rule to require
researchers to disclose all information that may be material to an individu248
al's decision to contribute.
4.

Blanket consent is prohibited.

Possibly one of the most important elements of fully informed consent
is a complete understanding of the type of research for which the contribu243. See id. at 388. It can even be argued that disclosing as much information as possible to potential research participants also serves the interests of researchers by reducing the risk that contributors
will initiate legal actions when they realize their expectations about the research were not met. Clayton
et al., supra note 9, at 1787.
244. See Skloot, supra note 8, at 45 (quoting David Kom).
245. See Buchanan, supra note 17, at B-10 ("A strong case can be made that current practices
concerning biological samples often fail to treat persons with due respect because they systematically
mislead regarding why samples are being taken and their uses.").
246. See NCI BEST PRACTICES, supra note 2, at 17 ("Respect for individuals who have provided
data or biospecimens for research is of paramount concern."); Blue, supra note 11, at 104 (emphasis
added) ("Ultimately, there appears to be a deep-seated feeling by many medical professionals in Westem democracies that decisions about the body must be made by the individual or his or her next of kin
and not society."). Blue also argues that, under the current system, "[p]eople are treated as means, not
ends, thereby violating many different religious and philosophical systems of respect for human dignity." Id. at 97.
247. Alpert, supranote 5, at A-14; see also Clayton et al., supranote 9, at 1787.
248. See Alpert, supra note 5, at A-13 ("[T]he more specific the information in the consent documents,... the more informed the consent will be."); NCI BEST PRACTICES, supra note 2, at 16;Harrison, supra note 226, at 84.
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tor's biological material may be used. 249 However, the Common Rule does
not explicitly require researchers to inform potential contributors of the fate
of their biological material once it has been removed. 250 Accordingly, researchers and institutions frequently utilize blanket consent in hopes of
saving time and money. 2 5 1 But, even if this gap in the Common Rule legally allows researchers to request blanket consent, doing so is still highly
unethical: 252 by failing to inform contributors of the potential uses of their
biological materials, researchers are essentially guaranteed to violate the
personal, moral, and religious beliefs of some individuals. 253 This is especially true considering that a poll commissioned by the Institute of Medicine (1OM) in 2007 found that thirty-eight percent of research participants
would want to be able to give their specific consent for each research use of
their personal information. 254 Therefore, the Common Rule should be
amended to clarify that researchers may not ask contributors to consent to
all future uses of their biological material, 255 and that researchers must put
forth a good faith effort to be as explicit as possible about the likely uses of
contributors' samples. 256
Certainly, this is not to say that researchers may only request use of a
sample for one specific study. Doing so would surely place insurmountable
obstacles in the path of future biomedical research, since researchers often
do not know what future research may be warranted at the time of contribu249. See NCI BEST PRACTICES, supra note 2, at 19 ("If appropriate.... human subjects may be
allowed to specify the types of research for which the contributed biospecimens will be used .... ).
250. Jordan & Price, supra note 198, at 167 n.92. Although requesting blanket consent is not
explicitly denounced in the Common Rule, it arguably violates the regulations' informed consent
requirements, since research participants are not first told about the risks and benefits of the specific
research for which their tissue is ultimately used. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2)-(3) (2008); Clayton,
supra note 236, at 19-20 (noting that many people "oppose allowing individuals to give blanket consent
for future research, arguing, for example, that it is impossible in that situation to make an informed
choice").
251. See Buchanan, supra note 17, at B-17.
252. Greely, supra note 6, at 344, 358; see COMM. ON HUMAN GENOME DIVERSITY, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, EVALUATING HUMAN GENETIC DIVERSITY 65 (1997) ("It is not ethically or
legally acceptable to ask research participants to 'consent' to future but yet-unknown uses of their
identifiable DNA samples."). For a discussion of the concept of blanket consent, see supra note 151.
253. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 27.
254. ALAN F. WESTIN, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS PRIVACY AND HEALTH RESEARCH 20 (2007)
www.iom.edu/File.aspx?ID=48528.
255. See Andrews, supra note 12, at 27 ("A general blanket consent to all future research should
not be considered sufficient to meet the standards of informed consent."); see also Ad Hoc Committee
on DNA Technology, American Society of Human Genetics, DNA Banking and DNA Analysis: Points
to Consider, 32 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 781, 782 (1988).
256. See NCI BEST PRACTICES, supra note 2, at 16 ("Obtaining informed consent for the collection
and storage of biospecimens and for their use in future research is challenging since the specifics of the
future research often are not known at the time of biospecimen collection. Despite this challenge, the
informed consent information describing the nature and purposes of the research should be as specific
as possible.").
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tion. 257 With this in mind, Professor Greely has advocated a two-pronged
strategy to eliminate the use of blanket consent that would ensure the continued advancement of biomedical research, while also respecting the
wishes of the human sources who make this important research possible. 258
The first prong involves continuing communication with research participants. 2 59 Researchers could accomplish this by creating a regularly updated webpage, or by frequently sending out a newsletter to all
contributors, informing them of plans for new research. 260 Contributors
could also be advised to contact the institution or biobank for further information about any research that may raise special concerns, allowing
them to determine if they want to opt out of a particular study. 26 1 Dr. Catalona actually utilized this method, sending out a quarterly newsletter to
contributors whose samples were stored in the GU Biorepository, and notifying them of the studies' status. 262
The second prong involves recontacting contributors before using
their biological materials for a new study. 263 Ideally, this would be done
before using a contributor's biological material in any study that the contributor did not originally consent to. 264 If this proved to be absolutely impossible, at least some potential harm to contributors would be avoided if
they were recontacted if an IRB 265 "concluded that there was reasonable
likelihood that a significant number of the research subjects might object to
participating in that research. '2 66 In either case, the responsible IRB could
require that the researchers obtain new, fully informed consent from each
source before proceeding to use his or her biological material in a particular
study. 267
257. See Greely, supranote 6, at 357.
258. It should be noted that these proposals would only help prevent the current problems with
regard to future collections of human biological material. Amending the Common Rule to adequately
resolve informed consent problems with regard to existing collections of samples "present[s] a special
challenge," and is beyond the scope of this note. See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 48.
259. See Greely, supranote 6, at 358.
260. Id.
261. Id. Similarly, Winickoff & Winickoff suggest using a website to keep contributors informed
about research projects and to allow them to opt out of future studies. Supra note 151, at 1183.
262. See Skloot, supra note 8, at 75; see also Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 993
(E.D. Mo. 2006) (stating that a quarterly newsletter was published by the Urological Research Foundation, of which Dr. Catalona was the Medical Director).
263. See Greely, supranote 6, at 358.
264. See id.
265. See supranote 68.
266. Greely, supra note 6, at 358. Alternatively, Professor Greely suggests that a committee of
research subjects-independently or in conjunction with the IRB-could be assembled to identify
potentially sensitive research topics. Id. at 358-59.
267. Id. at 358.
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In its report of recommended "best practices" issued in 2007, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) stated that researchers and biobanks "should
ensure that the research uses of [biological material] are consistent with the
informed consent of the research participant. ' 268 Researchers will be able
to successfully achieve this goal by maintaining communication with contributors-whether through a website, newsletter, or some other meansand ensuring that each future use of a contributor's sample is compatible
2 69
with his or her personal preferences.
5. Researchers cannot anonymize a sample after its contributor has
requested withdrawal.
According to the Common Rule, one of the basic elements of informed consent is "[a] statement that.., the subject may discontinue participation at any time .... ,,270 Furthermore, the NCI has asserted that, "if a
human subject discontinues participation, the investigator is required to
withdraw that subject from the research study."' 27 1 Nevertheless, after WU
refused to transfer several of the contributors' samples to Dr. Catalona, the
contributors attempted to exercise the right given to them in their consent
fonS272 by requesting that their tissues be removed from the GU Biorepository; again, WU refused, reading the relevant provision of the consent
form to mean that they could "anonymize" 273 a withdrawing contributor's
sample and continue to use it as they chose. 274 The district court agreed
with WU's interpretation of the consent form language. 27 5 The Eighth Circuit did not address the anonymization issue; rather, it merely stated that
one of the contributors' limited rights to their excised biological material
268. NCI BEST PRACTICES, supra note 2, at 17.
269. See Greely, supra note 6, at 358-59.
270. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (2008).
271. NCI BEST PRACTICES, supra note 2, at 19.
272. The consent forms signed by the GU Biorepository contributors stated that they may "withdraw [their] consent at any time." Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 990 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
273. Id. at 992 n.10. "Anonymization" is a term used to describe one method of purportedly protecting contributors' personal information. See Greely, supra note 6, at 349. When researchers attempt
to anonymize a sample of biological material, they do so by removing all personal identifiers on or
linked to the sample. Id. at 35 1. Theoretically, anonymizing a sample would make it impossible for
even biobank administrators to discover the identity of the sample's human source. Id.
274. Skloot, supra note 8, at 75. Contrary to WU's argument, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) does not
give WU the right to anonymize contributors' samples. Andrews, supra note 30, at 404. That provision,
which exempts certain research from the Common Rule, does not apply to samples that were collected
for research purposes, as they were in this case. Id.; see 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4). Likewise, that provision does not apply to identifiable samples, such as the contributors' samples in Catalona. See 45
C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4); Andrews, supra note 30, at 404.
275. The district court found that "the right to discontinue participation in a research project means
nothing more tha[n] the [research participant] has chosen not to provide any more biological materials."
Catalona,437 F. Supp. 2d at 1000.
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was the right to discontinue participation in the research. 27 6
WU's belief that it could engage in this practice may have resulted
from the Common Rule's failure to explain what is required of researchers
when a contributor asks to withdraw. 277 Nevertheless, two problems with
anonymization make it necessary to prohibit its use: (1) according to
NBAC, "true anonymity does not ultimately exist"; 2 78 and (2) it is unethi-

cal not to follow the express wishes of the human source who has requested
279
withdrawal of his or her biological material.
First, stripping codes or other identifying information from biological
material does not truly render a sample anonymous, largely because of
current technologies. 280 Although a researcher using an anonymized sample may not know the identity of the biological material's source and may
not even have access to personal or medical information regarding the
source, 281 NBAC has noted that, because human cells contain the complete
genetic code of their human source, "any cell from any part of the body
could be subjected to genetic analysis (with the potential for providing vast
282
amounts of information)."
Second, it is unethical to attempt to override a contributor's express
wishes that his or her sample be withdrawn by unlinking the contributor's
sample with his or her personal information or using any other anonymization technique, and then continuing to use the sample. 2 83 Doing so violates

the contributor's inalienable right not to be researched upon without voluntary and informed consent-a right given to the contributor by the Common Rule. 284 In addition, this practice assumes that contributors cannot be
harmed by research conducted on their anonymized biological material;
however, such an assumption fails to account for the less tangible interests
a contributor may have in his or her biological material. 285 Since contribu276. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 675 (8th Cir. 2007).
277. See Catalona,437 F. Supp. 2d at 992; IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 163, at ch. 5, § H (citation
omitted) ("The federal regulations clearly require that subjects be free to withdraw from participation
without penalty or loss of benefits to which they are otherwise entitled. What the regulations do not
address, however, is how to treat data or tissue samples obtained from subjects who subsequently
withdraw from the study.").
278. NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 41.
279. See Greely, supra note 6, at 352-53.
280. See Brief of Us TOO, International, supra note 171, at 12; NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 41;
Greely, supra note 6, at 351 ("With a rich set of data, [anonymization] will not work-some, and
potentially all, of the donors could be re-identified.").
281. See NBAC REPORT, supranote 1, at 16-17.
282. Id. at 41; see also Buchanan, supra note 17, at B-3.
283. See Greely, supra note 6, at 352.
284. Brief of Us TOO, International, supra note 171, at 5, II.
285. NBAC sets forth a rather compelling argument that this assumption is misguided:
[I]t is incorrect to assume that because the sources cannot be identified they cannot be harmed
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tors may place an intrinsic value in their own biological material, regardless of whether it is linked to them, 28 6 using a sample for certain research
purposes after its withdrawal or destruction has been requested may still
violate the personal preferences, morals, or religious beliefs of its human
source. 287 Thus, whether a contributor requests to withdraw for moral or
religious reasons, or even for no specific reason at all, researchers must
28 8
abide by the contributor's wishes.
Because anonymization is neither possible nor ethical, the Common
Rule must be amended to reflect this. The regulations should, at the very
least, specify that researchers may not continue to use a sample if its source
has objected to its use, 289 and that a contributor's sample must be destroyed
and disposed of if the contributor has asked to discontinue participation in
or withdraw from a study. 290 Further, if the other recommendations presented in this note are implemented, the regulations could provide more
specific instructions explaining what is required when a contributor makes
29
such a request.

C.

1

Reforming the Common Rule Will Facilitatethe Goals of Biomedical
Research
As NBAC observed, "[p]roperly interpreted and modestly modified,

or wronged. Some interests of the sample sources may be harmed even if they are not completely identifiable, and interests of others may also be at risk. For example, there may be
group or family interests that could be revealed or placed at risk because of research that is
conducted on a class of similar, albeit individually unidentifiable, samples. Individuals have
an interest in avoiding uses of their tissues that they regard as morally impermissible or objectionable. Thus, were their materials to be used in research that they would consider objectionable, it is possible that some individuals could be wronged, if not harmed.
NBAC REPORT, supra note I, at 60-61; see also Buchanan, supra note 17, at B-22; Greely, supra note
6, at 356.
286. Philip L. Bereano, Viewpoint, The National Bioethics Advisory Commission Report on the
Use of Human Biological Materialsand Research: Ethical Issues and Policy Guidelines, 18 BIOTECH.
L. REP. 322, 325 (1999).
287. See Brief of Us TOO, International, supra note 171, at 5; Andrews, supra note 12, at 24.
288. In a similar context, California recently enacted regulations governing the funding of research
involving regenerative medicine; these regulations "require researchers to honor the limits set by donors
of embryos or gametes on the kinds of work that can be done even with donated tissue that has been
'anonymized'-a rule consistent with a theory of property rights in tissue." Charo, supra note 153, at
1518.
289. See supra text accompanying note 271.
290. See NCI BEST PRACTICES, supra note 2, at 19-20. Two possible actions researchers or biobanks could take if a contributor requests to discontinue participation include: (1) cease using the
contributor's sample in the study; or (2) destroy the contributor's sample and accompanying private
information. See id.
291. For instance, if the regulations are amended to clarify that contributors retain control over the
fate of their biological materials, they could also specify that if a contributor requests to withdraw from
a particular study, he or she may give the researcher consent to transfer the sample to another researcher
at the contributor's request.
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present federal regulations can protect subjects' rights and interests and at
the same time permit well-designed research to go forward ....-292 This is
possible because human contributors and researchers do, in fact, share the
common goal of continuing biomedical advancement. 29 3 The problem is,
they have conflicting viewpoints on how to best achieve this objective.
On the one hand, the fact that researchers in this area depend on
access to vast amounts of human biological material 294 appears to cause
many of them to feel entitled to this material-and entitled to use it in any
way they see fit. To illustrate, David Kom, the senior vice president of the
AAMC, believes that "'people are morally obligated to allow their bits and
pieces to be used to advance knowledge to help others,"' and argues that,
"'[s]ince everybody benefits, everybody can accept the small risks of having their tissue scraps used in research."' 295 Yet, many contributors see the
situation differently. Statements like Kom's lead contributors to feel like
they are not being shown the respect they deserve-like they are being
treated as a commodity, not a human being. 296 According to Dr. Ellen
Wright Clayton, the fundamental problem stems from "'the notion that the
people these tissues come from don't matter."'' 2 97 It has become clear that
current practices have, or threaten to alienate contributors of biological
material by severing their trust in researchers and research institutions. 298
And, because contributors' trust is vital to their willingness to contribute, 299 losing it could potentially lead to insurmountable obstacles for
292. NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at ii; see Clayton et al., supra note 9, at 1787 (explaining that
the federal regulations "are the embodiment of an attempt to strike a balance between the desire to
increase knowledge and the protection of individual interests").
293. See Oberdorfer, supra note 239, at 388; see also NBAC REPORT, supra note 1,at 4 (noting
that biomedical research "is supported vigorously by the American public").
294. NBAC REPORT, supra note 1,at 19 ("Biomedical research routinely relies on the availability
of stored human biological materials as well as the willingness of individuals to participate in research
protocols by donating blood, tissue, or DNA samples to research. Research in cancer, infectious diseases, and mental disorders is advanced by access to such materials.").
295. Skloot, supra note 8, at 45 (quoting David Kom). While ideas like Kom's are important to
consider, there are many problems with his arguments. First, it is undoubtedly critical to retain the value
of biological materials to enable them to be most effectively used; however, it is unacceptable to do so
at the expense of the human sources' diminished sense of value. In addition, people are not morally
obligated to allow pieces of themselves to be used in biomedical research, especially if doing so goes
against their moral or religious beliefs. And, it simply is not true that everyone benefits from this research: for instance, if a contributor's biological material is used to discover a particular treatment,
which is subsequently patented, that contributor may not benefit at all if he or she is unable to afford the
cost of the treatment. See Andrews, supra note 12, at 28.
296. See Skloot, supra note 8, at 75 (quoting Richard Ward, one of the eight contributor-defendants
in Catalona) ("'[WU] is saying they own part of our bodies ....They're trying to preserve their financial interest over our lives and our kids' lives.., just thinking about that makes me crazy."').
297. Id. at 45 (quoting Dr. Ellen Wright Clayton).
298. See Clayton, supra note 181, at 15; see also NBAC REPORT, supra note 1,at 42.
299. See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1,at 42.
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biomedical research.300
To better illustrate how each of the above recommendations will facilitate the goals of biomedical research, it is necessary to understand how
they fit into the entire process. First, if contributors are protected by the
Common Rule, if they retain the right to control the specific type of research that is conducted using their biological materials, and if they are
aware of all the information that would likely influence their decision to
contribute, they will undoubtedly be more willing to give up a piece of
themselves for the sake of advancing science. 30 1 Contributors will also be
less likely to withdraw their samples from research if they remain fully
informed about the uses of their biological material, and if they are able to
consent to its future uses. 302 In turn, researchers will not be tempted to
override the withdrawing contributors' wishes by trying to anonymize their
samples. 303 This will ultimately allow researchers to conduct more thorough studies, since having more information about the source is strongly
preferred, if not necessary. 304 In the end, contributors' rights and interests
will be more fully protected, and researchers will have access to vast
amounts of human biological material and its accompanying informationequipped to continue their remarkable innovation and discovery. 305
CONCLUSION

As it stands now, the Common Rule's failure to adequately protect

300. See id. In her testimony at the district court hearing, Dr. Ellen Wright Clayton stated: "I think
that if patients... understand that when or if it becomes the law that when you provide samples for
research that you in fact lose all control, that you have no ight to withdraw at all, then in fact it will
radically undermine.., the research enterprise." Transcript of Hearing, supranote 105, at vol. 1, 122.
301. See Clayton et al., supra note 9, at 1789 ("Patients and their families will often be willing to
cooperate when apprised of the investigator's desires."); Skloot, supra note 8, at 75 (noting that, in Dr.
Catalona's opinion, "'[i]f you're honest with patients, and they understand what you're doing, they'll let
you use their tissues-they want to advance science as much as we do"').
302. See Post Hearing Brief of Patient/Defendants, supra note 78, at 23 ("Only if patients have the
ight to participate fully and knowingly, coupled with a meaningful right to withdraw, will they be
willing to participate in new and increasingly risky research projects.").
303. See NBAC REPORT, supranote 1, at 71.
304. See id. at 2 ("Sometimes, however, it is necessary to identify the source of the research sample, because the research value of the material depends upon linking findings regarding the biology of
the sample with updated information from medical or other records pertaining to its source."); Greely,
supra note 6, at 352 ("The more the data is removed or obscured, the more scientific value is lost.").
305. See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 42 ("[V]irtually all parties to the discussion acknowledge
both the value of biomedical research and the need to minimize harms and wrongs to subjects. Indeed,
the challenge is not to trade off the potential health benefits from research against the protection of
sources and others, but rather to find ways in which to maximize the opportunities for developing new
knowledge and new treatments while, at the same time, ensuring appropriate protections from harms
and wrongs. Only then will the public have the degree of trust in researchers and confidence in scientific research that is needed to facilitate important scientific breakthroughs.").

2009]

YOUDON'TOWNME

human subjects threatens to alienate existing and future contributors of
biological material across the United States. And the Eighth Circuit's misguided decision in Catalonamay only exacerbate the situation, as researchers and biorepository administrators will likely interpret it as the court
placing their stamp of approval on many unethical and deceptive practices.
It is clear, then, that regulatory reform is imperative. Although they are by
no means exhaustive, the recommendations set forth in this note will enable
the continued advancement of biomedical research, without compromising
the rights and interests of the individuals who fuel researchers' discovery
and innovation.
But, until there is meaningful change to the regulations, the debate
over these issues will carry on, and the American public will continue to
learn the truth about human biological materials research-that what they
assumed or thought they knew is not what is really taking place. Consequently, more and more potential contributors may think twice before signing on the dotted line, and many of them may even be deterred from
contributing altogether. In pursuit of short-term research gains and even
administrative convenience, researchers and institutions are risking the
long-term goals of biomedical research by ignoring or discounting the
rights, wishes, and interests of human subjects.
Alternatively, if researchers show more respect to the human sources
of biological material by fully disclosing all pertinent information, most
potential contributors will assuredly agree to assist researchers in their
quest to discover the causes, treatments, and cures for serious medical conditions. But no matter how pressing the need to advance biomedical
science, it cannot usurp the need to respect the dignity and deeply held
personal beliefs of individual people. This is especially true when considering the fact that innovation and discovery can continue just as well-if not
better-by respecting and earning the trust of the human sources who make
this research possible.

